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THE ROLE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN PUSHING
THE BOUNDARIES OF U.S. REGULATION: A SYSTEMATIC
REVIEW
Carlos Ignacio Gutierrez Gaviria, PhD
Artificial Intelligence’s (AI) growing catalog of applications and
methods has the potential to profoundly affect public policy by
generating instances where regulations are not adequate to confront
the issues faced by society, also known as regulatory gaps. The
objective of this article is to improve our understanding of how AI
influences U.S. public policy. It does so by systematically exploring,
for the first time, this technology’s role in the generation of regulatory
gaps. Specifically, it addresses two research questions:
1. What U.S. regulatory gaps exist due to AI methods and
applications?
2. When looking across all of the gaps identified in the first
research question, what trends and insights emerge that can
help stakeholders plan for the future?
These questions are answered through a systematic review of four
academic literature databases in the hard and social sciences. Its
implementation is guided by a protocol that identified 5,240 candidate
articles. A screening process reduced this sample to 241 articles
(published between 1976 and February of 2018) relevant to answering
the research questions.
This article contributes to the literature by adapting the work of
Bennett-Moses and Calo to effectively characterize regulatory gaps
caused by AI in the U.S. In addition, it finds that most gaps: do not
require new regulation or the creation of governance frameworks for
their resolution, are found at the federal and state levels of government,
and AI applications are recognized more often than methods as their
cause.
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INTRODUCTION
As a formal discipline, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is over 60
years old. In this time, breakthroughs in the field have generated
technology that compares to or outperforms humans in tasks requiring
creativity and complex reasoning. Moreover, all sectors of the
economy are increasingly subject to AI’s influence due to rapid
advances in information processing and consumer demand for
competitive offerings. Many of this technology’s applications or
methods have no discernable effect on how public policy is interpreted
or applied, making them policy agnostic.1 This article excludes this
category of technology from its analysis and devotes all of its attention
to AI-based technologies that currently have or will have a profound
impact on society and government.
The literature on the relationship between policy and AI is
generally siloed, and limited resources are dedicated to taking a broad
look across the corpus of this technology’s social impact.2 Even less
attention is given to instances where public policies are no longer
adequate to confront the issues faced by society due to technology,
known as regulatory gaps. This article contributes to the literature
through the implementation of a systematic review that will, for the
first time, examine the role of AI in creating U.S.-based regulatory
gaps. Specifically, it addresses two research questions:
1. What U.S. regulatory gaps exist due to AI methods and
applications?
2. When looking across all of the gaps identified in the first
research question, what trends and insights emerge that can
help stakeholders plan for the future?
The answers to these research questions are divided into four
sections. The first section offers a definition and classification of
regulatory gaps, a concept that describes the clash between technology
and policy. Section two contains a protocol for a systematic review of
the literature on the relationship between AI and policy. A systematic
review is a methodology that “attempts to collect and analyze all
1

Lyria Bennett-Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep up
with Technological Change, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 241 (2007).
2
See Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 399, 427 (2017). (stating that “notably missing is any
systematic review of the ways AI challenges existing legal doctrines”).
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evidence that answers a specific question” through a “broad and
thorough search of the literature.”3 In fact, systematic reviews featuring
AI already exist, many are published in health and engineering journals
that focus on the effectiveness of medical treatment, among other
subjects. 4 Because few efforts examine the corpus of AI’s impact on
U.S. public policy,5 this methodology was selected as a means to
thoroughly gather literature on this issue.
Section three answers this article’s first research question by
identifying 50 regulatory gaps caused by AI methods or applications.
These gaps are cataloged based on several variables such as type of gap
(Bennett-Moses’s framework), theme they fall under (adapted from
Calo’s taxonomy), level of government involved (federal, state, and
local), temporality (whether they describe an event happening in the
present or speculate about one in the future), and if the gap is caused
by an application (a technology’s purpose) or method
(process/procedure to accomplish its purpose) of AI. Finally, section
four answers the second research question by uncovering insights from
the systematic review’s results.
The long-term goal of this article is to introduce a compelling
alternative to frame how we understand and discuss the interaction
between policy and AI. Specifically, the desired impact is that it serves
stakeholders through two concrete outcomes. First, the systematic
review can become a reference guide for policymakers at all levels of
government (in the U.S. and beyond) on the policies susceptible to AIbased regulatory gaps.6 Second, private sector representatives can

3
Systematic Reviews, STEPHEN B. THACKER CDC LIBRARY,
https://www.cdc.gov/library/researchguides/systematicreviews.html (last
updated June 4, 2020).
4
Julian P.T. Higgins & Sally Green, Cochrane Handbook for Systematic
Reviews of Interventions (2011), http://handbook-5-1.cochrane.org/. (select
“Handbook hyperlink; then click “Part I: Cochrane reviews”; then click
“Chapter 1: Introduction”; then click “1.2 systematic reviews”; then click
“1.2.1 The need for systematic reviews”).
5
Calo, supra note 2.
6
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, REPORT, AI IN THE UK:
READY, WILLING AND ABLE?, 2017-19, HL 100, at 118 (UK),
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldai/100/100.pdf.
(The Government Office for AI, with the Centre for Data Ethics and
Innovation, needs to identify the gaps, if any, where existing regulation may
not be adequate”).
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gauge whether the return on investment in their pipeline of AI products
or services will be affected by the current state of regulatory gaps.
I.

REGULATORY GAPS

Regulation or policy serves as the formal mechanism or
explicit corpus of rules that represent a group’s shared values.
Government serves as the authority vested with the power to uphold
these interests.7 No standard operating procedures exist for policy’s
role when it intersects with technology. In fact, policymakers are not
overwhelmed by the introduction of technology in the market because
their attention is not required for every product or service. For instance,
3M’s Post-it® represents a leap in productivity and creativity, but its
use by consumers does not motivate adjustment to how government
performs its duties.
There are technologies that do not conform to extant policies.
They catalyze behavior that may create a vacuum in the status quo and
force policymakers to adjust the tools at their disposal to either
maximize their benefits or minimize drawbacks. Scenarios where this
type of action is needed are called regulatory gaps, also known in the
literature as policy vacuums or the pacing problem.8 In this text,
regulatory gaps are defined as instances where public policies cease to
adequately confront the issues faced by society.
The concept of a regulatory gap is not novel. In fact, the
characterization of policy orthodoxy being outrun by technology is a
truism in the literature.9 As time passes, the number of regulatory gaps
7

Julia Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, 27 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 1, 3
(2002), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/35985/1/Disspaper4-1.pdf; Arthur J.
Cockfield, Towards a Law and Technology Theory, 30 MANIT. LAW J. 383
(2004).
8
See Karinne Ludlow & Michael G. Bennett, Regulating Emerging and
Future Technologies in the Present, 9 NANOETHICS, 151, 152 (2015)
(authors highlight that the "pacing problem or challenge of regulatory
disconnection" is an issue that is gaining the attention of scholars); James H
Moor, What is Computer Ethics? 16 METAPHILOSOPHY 266, 266 (1985) (the
article states that “a typical problem in computer ethics arises because there
is a policy vacuum about how computer technology should be used”).
9
See e.g., Diana M Bowman, The Hare and the Tortoise: An Australian
Perspective on Regulating New Technologies and their Products and
Processes, INNOVATIVE GOVERNANCE MODELS FOR EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES (Gary E. Marchant & Braden Allenby eds., 2013); L.A,
Clark, W.J. Clark & D. L. Jones, Innovation Policy Vacuum: Navigating
Unmarked Paths, 33 TECH. SOC'Y. 253 (2011),
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catalyzed by technology seems to have increasingly made it difficult
for policymakers to match the pace of change. The former Office of
Technology Assessment of the U.S. described this trend over thirty
years ago, stating that:
“[o]nce a relatively slow and ponderous process, technological
change is now outpacing the legal structure that governs the
system, and is creating pressures on Congress to adjust the law
to accommodate these changes.”10
Fundamentally, these gaps are caused by the nature of policy
and technology. Policy is a by-product of the circumstances,
individuals, and politics relevant at the time of its creation. The process
is comparable to estimating the rules and tools applicable to society in
an unknown version of the future, one where decision-makers can opt
to plan for the worst-case scenario or for a sample of situations that are
likely to occur.11 Policy-making is a best-guess approximation
contingent on assumptions that may not hold true and relies on a
network of formal and informal decision-makers that balance

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160791X1100042X;
Alan Heinrich, Karl Manheim & David J. Steele, Introduction, LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1035 (2000); Michael Kirby, Chief Justice, High Court of Australia,
The Commonwealth Lawyer: Law in an Age of Fantastic Technological
Change (June 4, 2001),
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/formerjustices/kirbyj/kirbyj_thecommonwealthlawyer.htm; Ludlow & Bennett,
supra note 8; U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION (1986),
https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk2/1986/8610/8610.PDF; Erica
Palmerini, The Interplay Between Law and Technology, or the RoboLaw
Project in Context, in LAW AND TECHNOLOGY: THE CHALLENGE OF
REGULATING TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT (Erica Palmerini & Elettra
Stradella eds., 2013),
http://www.robolaw.eu/RoboLaw_files/documents/Palmerini_Intro.pdf;
Colin B. Picker, A View from 40,000 Feet: International Law and the
Invisible Hand of Technology, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 151 (2001); David M.
Wasieleski & Mordechai Gal-Or, An Enquiry into the Ethical Efficacy of the
Use of Radio Frequency Identification Technology, 10 ETHICS INF. TECH. 27
(2008).
10
U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 9, at 10.
11
See Warren E. Walker, Vincent A..W.J Marchau & Darren Swanson,
Addressing Deep Uncertainty Using Adaptive Policies: Introduction to
Section 2, 77 TECH. FORECASTING SOC'Y CHANGE 917 (2010).
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constituent accountability, transparency, or personal interests, but not
necessarily expediency.12 To identify, understand, measure, and
analyze their options, these actors require layers of information on how
technology-based phenomena affect policy.13 Procuring this data
without asymmetries or lag is not only problematic; most times it is
untenable. As a result, policy reaction times are slower than
technology. If action is rushed, it can disadvantage future technological
progress or segments of the population affected by it.14
On the other hand, technology is created by individuals and
firms that face a different environment – one where supply and demand
are king and the generation of new products and services is not
generally beholden to policy barriers or the policy-making process.
Instead, technologies are mainly bound by the creativity of engineers
or managers running the firm and the resources at their disposal to
execute their vision. Such flexibility endows this population with the
power to act without having the democratic process as an obstacle or
face the same scrutiny as public officials. In effect, members of the
private sector could be described as the anti-policymaker, one that can
subject society to the consequences of their actions without consent.15
A. Classification of Regulatory Gaps
With the power to introduce technology at any point in time,
the private sector can directly affect the government by generating
regulatory gaps. According to Bennett-Moses, technology can
challenge regulation in one of four ways: uncertainty, novelty,

12
See Warren E. Walker, S. Adnan Rahman & Jonathan Cave, Adaptive
Policies, Policy Analysis, and Policy-Making, 128 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL
RES. 282 (2001),
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221700000710.
13
BRONWEN MORGAN & KAREN YEUNG, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
REGULATION: TEXT AND MATERIALS 85 (2003),
http://fcthighcourtelibrary.com/maitama/library/ebooks/eb7/Introduction law
and regulation.pdf.
14
Ludlow & Bennett, supra note 8, at 152.
15
Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information
Policy Rules through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998),
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1041&context=facu
lty_scholarship (“Although states may influence the decisions made by
technologists through legal restraints on policy choices,' the technologists
otherwise "enact" or make the technical standards, and the users adopt
precise interpretations through practices….”).
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obsolescence, and targeting.16 This section defines each category (see
Table 1).17
Table 1 – Classification of Regulatory Gaps
Uncertainty

Targeting

Obsolescence

Novelty

A technology is
not
easily
classified
and
inconsistency in
the application of
policy leads to
conflict.

With respect to a
policy goal, one
can ask whether
there
are
circumstances in
which
its
application is not
directed to the
goal, but fall
within its scope
(overinclusiveness) or
whether there are
circumstances
falling outside its
scope where its
application would
further the goal
(underinclusiveness).

Policy
becomes
irrelevant when its
target behavior or
justification is no
longer pertinent to
current conditions
or the cost of
violating
or
enforcing
it
changes.

Policies need to be
created to resolve a
challenge.
A
technology
can
instigate behaviors
that are unique to
the point that
policymakers had
not thought of
addressing them or
there are new
reasons to act on
existing situations
that
require
bespoke attention.

Source: 18
1. Uncertainty
Technology can instigate uncertainty when there are
contradictions, inconsistencies, or doubts about its classification.19
Misclassification occurs because policy is not created to foresee all
conceivable permutations and combinations of events or behaviors. At
16

Bennett-Moses, supra note 1, at 248.
The identification of regulatory gaps is inherently a subjective process.
Individuals with contrasting views may differ in their interpretation of these
phenomena.
18
See Bennett-Moses, supra note 1, at 248.
19
Id. at 255.
17
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times, the vague language within policy instruments is observed when
a word or statement has more than one meaning or is deemed
contestable if alternate explanations are available.20 As a result, the
outcomes experienced by society can be haphazard and contingent on
the jurisdiction or judgment of individuals involved in interpreting
policy.
2. Targeting
Policies are created with a goal or purpose in mind, and they
target behaviors based on the conditions prevalent at the time.
Technology may generate situations that affect a policy’s purpose in
two ways. They can be under-inclusive with respect to the policy’s
purpose. This means that they create conditions that fall outside its
scope, but if included would further its objective.21 Alternatively, they
can be over-inclusive. This describes a situation that lies outside the
scope of a policy’s purpose, but is nonetheless included in it.22
3. Obsolescence
Technology can impact policy to the point of making it
irrelevant. One vector for this is that the policy’s target behavior or its
justification is no longer pertinent to current conditions.23 Another is
that technology may increase the enforcement costs of a policy, which
creates disincentives to implement it.24 It can do so by creating barriers
to its application, thus rendering it irrelevant.
4. Novelty
Novelty regulatory gaps occur when policies, or any of their
variants, need to be created to resolve a challenge.25 Technology can
instigate behaviors that are unique to the point that policymakers had
20

See Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social
Orders, 82 CALIF. L. REV. (1994),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3480970.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ac3c5e7f
cb35e32c3eb91a85374630cde (discussing the different ways in which
vagueness in legal instruments can cause differences in explanation or have
several meanings); Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some
Philosophical Issues, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 509 (1994).
21
Bennett-Moses, supra note 1, at 259.
22
Id.
23
See Bennett-Moses, supra note 1, at 265.
24
Id.
25
See Bennett-Moses, supra note 1, at 248-50.
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not thought of addressing them or there are new reasons to act on
existing situations that require bespoke attention.26
II.

PROTOCOL FOR THE SYSTEMATIC REVIEW

This article began by introducing the concept of regulatory
gaps. This section contains the protocol utilized to implement a
systematic review of the literature on regulatory gaps caused by AI in
the U.S. It describes the process undertaken to identify and screen
articles relevant to this effort’s research objectives. This protocol
conforms to the PRISMA guidelines, and a version of it is published in
the Open Science Framework (see Appendix 1 for the PRISMA
Checklist).27
The systematic review methodology was selected because it
“attempts to collect and analyze all evidence that answers a specific
question” through a “broad and thorough search of the literature.”28 As
Calo points out, limited efforts have been undertaken to examine the
corpus of AI’s impact on U.S. public policy. 29 This effort responds to
Calo’s challenge for a thorough and systematic analysis of the literature
on the intersection between AI and policy.
A. Objective of This Systematic Review
This protocol outlines the steps taken to conduct a systematic
review that identifies regulatory gaps generated by AI methods and
applications in the U.S. It represents a first approach to developing an
overarching understanding of how this technology interacts with policy
by answering the following research questions:
1. What U.S. regulatory gaps exist due to AI methods and
applications?
2. When looking across all of the gaps identified in the first
research question, what trends and insights emerge that can
help stakeholders plan for the future?

26

Id.
David Moher et al., Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and
Meta-Analyses: The PRISMA Statement, PLOS MED. (2009),
http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.10000
97.
The protocol can be found at https://osf.io/f9uzy/.
28
CDC Library, supra note 3.
29
Calo, supra note 2.
27
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B. Information Sources
Because of its multi-disciplinary nature, this systematic review
considered databases with publications in the social (e.g. political
science, philosophy, law reviews, and public policy) and hard sciences
(e.g. computer science, AI, and systems engineering). Valuable
research that links AI with policy can be found in both types of
databases; hence, neither warrants exclusion. With the assistance of a
research librarian at the RAND Corporation, six databases that covered
literature within the fields of interest were contemplated. Two of them
provide a legal lens by covering articles in law reviews (Lexis Nexis
and Hein Online), three combine literature from all fields (Scopus, Web
of Science, and JSTOR), and one focuses on public policy (Policy File
Index).
Table 2 - Systematic Review Databases
Databases
Information Covered
Over 5,000 publishers and 1.4 billion cited
references in science, mathematics,
Scopus
engineering, technology, arts, and
humanities.
Its core collection has over 18,000 journals
and 1.3 billion cited references in the
Web of Science
sciences, social sciences, arts, and
humanities.
Humanities, social sciences, sciences, and
JSTOR
mathematics. 2,300 journals and 1,000
publishers.
Law review database that covers over 740
Lexis Nexis
law journals from the U.S. from 1982 to
today.
Reports from over 300 active think tanks,
Policy File Index
research organizations, and advocacy
groups.
Hein Online – Law Contains more than 2,500 law and lawlibrary
related periodicals.
C. Search Strategy
The selection of keywords to extract relevant articles from
databases is an art. Three strategies were tested to detect publications
that answered both research questions (see Table 3). The keywords
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from each strategy are broken down into words related to technology
(in the form of AI methods and applications) and those relevant to a
policymaker’s role in society. Strategy one minimizes the number of
technology terms by only including the name of the field. Strategy two
consists of synonyms related to AI taken from another systematic
review.30 Strategy three is a compromise between strategies one and
two. It contains the name of the technology and a limited number of
methodologies associated with it.
Table 3 - Keyword Search Strategy
Technology Keywords

Policy Keywords
(law* OR policy OR
govern* OR regulat* OR
public OR oversight* OR
legislation OR enforce*)

Strategy
1

Artificial Intelligence

Strategy
2

"Machine
Learning"
OR
"Artificial Intelligence" OR
"Natural Language Processing"
OR "Neural Networks" OR
"Support Vector Machine" OR
Machine learning OR Artificial
Intelligence OR Naive Bayes
OR bayesian learning OR
Neural network OR Neural
networks OR Natural language
processing OR support vector*
OR random forest* OR
boosting OR deep learning OR
machine
intelligence
OR
computational intelligence OR
computer reasoning

Strategy
3

(law* OR policy OR
("Machine Learning" OR
govern* OR regulat* OR
"Artificial Intelligence" OR
public OR oversight*
"Natural Language Processing"
OR legislation OR
OR "Neural Networks")
enforce*)

(law* OR policy OR
govern* OR regulat* OR
public OR oversight* OR
legislation OR enforce*)

To uncover the strategy and databases with the largest number
of relevant articles, an evaluation of 200 titles per strategy/database
30

See generally Joeky T Senders et al., Natural and Artificial Intelligence in
Neurosurgery: A Systematic Review, NEUROSURGERY (2017),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28945910.
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was performed in February of 2018. In this step, any title that appeared
to connect AI and public policy was considered relevant. To minimize
bias, articles were sorted in chronological order (most recent first). This
was done to avoid relying on each database’s unknown criteria to
arrange articles according to their “relevance.” The results of this
exercise evinced a higher prevalence of articles relevant to this work
using the first strategy (Table 4). It is worth noting that search strategy
two could not be performed with JSTOR or Lexis Nexis due to the
database’s character limit in their search parameters.
Table 4 - Evaluation of Relevant Articles
Database
Strategy 1
Strategy 2
Scopus
13/200
1/200
Web of science 24/200
0/200
JSTOR
7/200
NA
Policy
file 16/50
19/200
index
Hein Online
74/200
1/200
Lexis Nexis
46/200
NA
Total
17.3%
3.5%

Strategy 3
0/200
1/200
5/200
23/83
53/200
41/200
11.35%

Table 5 breaks down the relevance rate for articles within
databases in strategy one. Those with content predominantly in the
social sciences were more likely to include screened-in articles. This
was especially the case for databases with journals in the legal field
(Hein Online and Lexis Nexis). It is important to note that 81% of the
journals published within Lexis Nexis were also in Hein Online.31
Table 5 - Summary of Strategy 1 Evaluation
Database
% Relevant Relevant
articles
Hein Online
37%
74/200
Policy
File 32%
16/50
Index
Lexis Nexis
23%
46/200
Web
of 12%
24/200
science
Scopus
7%
13/200
JSTOR
4%
7/200
31

Total #
articles
2,108
50

of

2,012
1,070
20,074
5,686

In terms of articles examined in the preliminary evaluation, 35% of all prescreened and 31% of screened-in titles were found in both databases.
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Based on this exercise’s results, databases with a relevance rate below
10% were excluded from the systematic review. With rates of 4% and
7%, the 25,760 articles in JSTOR and Scopus did not undergo further
consideration. This left a total of 5,240 articles to be evaluated using
the previously described screening criteria.
D. Screening of Articles
Articles underwent three phases of screening (Figure 1). First,
duplicates and excluded categories were eliminated. Second, titles and
abstracts were subject to an evaluation based on the inclusion and
exclusion criteria (Table 6). Third, the entire text of screened-in articles
was read.
Figure 1 - Flow chart of citations reviewed

Included articles generally connected methods or applications
of AI with public policy in the U.S. (e.g., liability implications of
autonomous vehicles or the discovery of bias in AI algorithms
developed for the criminal justice system). Articles with no clear link
between policy and AI were discarded (e.g., new neural network
methodologies or technical policies to create more efficient
algorithms). Furthermore, articles that discussed how AI methods and
applications could benefit or augment public policy were deemed
outside of this review’s purview (e.g., improving dynamic traffic light
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management). Inconclusive articles were screened-in to assess their
full-text against the inclusion and exclusion criteria.
Table 6 - Screening Criteria for Systematic Review
Inclusion
Exclusion
• Written in English
• Comments and notes within
law journals
• Academic papers or
reports
• Technical articles in the field
of the hard sciences that do not
• Mention of AI methods or
mention policy issues
applications
• Mention
of
policy • Symposium/conference
articles,
books,
reviews,
repercussions connected
PowerPoint
presentations,
to AI
news, blogs, theses, and
• Content is accessible to
pamphlets
the author
• To the extent possible,
U.S. publications or
articles that emphasize
U.S. policy implications
Where possible, works published outside the U.S. were
excluded (Hein Online is the only database that discriminates the
geographic origin of articles). Notes, comments, and pieces written by
graduate students in law reviews were excluded because they represent
a medium of expression for scholars in development (Hein Online is
the only database that labels these documents). In the Policy File Index,
dissertations, classified ads, and news articles were excluded.
Symposiums and conference proceedings were omitted because they
may represent draft versions of documents that are subsequently
evaluated by academic journals. Articles in this systematic review were
not screened based on an author’s definition of AI. Instead, it relied on
the review process within academic publications to validate the use of
the term.
E. Analysis
Regulatory gaps caused by AI in the U.S. were identified from
articles that successfully passed the three phases of screening. The
analysis entailed developing a narrative synthesis of the gaps and
uncovering the overarching trends.
Articles deemed relevant underwent a process where excerpts
were extracted and labeled (see Table 7). The first label is Bennet-
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Moses’ framework for classifying regulatory gaps caused by
technology.32 Next is Calo’s taxonomy that groups the interaction by
AI and public policy into social themes.33 This is followed by labels for
government jurisdiction, temporality of the gap (that are currently
experienced by policymakers or speculated to occur in the future), and
type of AI (whether the gap is caused by a method, refers to approaches
to accomplish a goal, or an application, the goal itself). These labels
represent a starting point and could be adjusted based on the outcome
of the systematic review.
Table 7 – Systematic Review Labels

Regulatory
Gap
(BennettMoses 2007)

Policy
Theme
(Calo 2017)

Level
of
Temporality Type of AI
Government

Uncertainty

Justice
Equity

and Local

Novelty

Use of Force

Targeting

Privacy and Federal
Power

State

Obsolescence Safety and
Certification
Taxation and
displacement
of labor

32
33

See generally Bennett-Moses, supra note 1.
See generally Calo, supra note 2.

Present

Method

Future

Application
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F. Limitations
This systematic review is constrained by several issues. The
most important is its nature. This effort is systematic and not
comprehensive or exhaustive. Thus, important regulatory gaps in the
literature are not represented. Moreover, only a sample of sources from
1976 to 2018 are consulted. This means that important events or
arguments impacting the governance of AI are probably excluded.
The implementation of the protocol relied on the effort of one
researcher. Having a limited number of contributors increases the
likelihood of bias in assigning labels or interpreting trends. It is
possible that peers with similar data could have reached diametrically
different conclusions. Therefore, all asseverations within this
document should be subject to further scrutiny.
This work represents a first attempt to provide an empirical
basis to the characterization of regulatory gaps caused by AI in the U.S.
Critics may rightfully argue that the time lag between the last published
date of an article in the systematic review (February of 2018) and its
completion (2020) diminishes its usefulness to stakeholders. While this
is a valid point, government action on any subject tends to function at
a slower speed than change generated by technology. Based on this, it
is expected that the information within this work will continue to be
relevant for the foreseeable future.
Lastly, no effort was taken to present solutions to any of the
regulatory gaps identified. Doing so is a process that requires
developing a theory of governance with respect to the role of regulation
in society. Future scholars should research plausible alternatives for the
gaps identified in this systematic review.
III.

REGULATORY GAPS IDENTIFIED

The analysis of 241 articles in the hard and social sciences led
to the identification of 50 regulatory gaps generated by methods and
applications of AI (see Table 8). The information within this section
answers this article’s first research question: what U.S. regulatory gaps
exist due to AI methods and applications?
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Table 8 - Distribution of Citations in the Systematic Review*
Total Citations in the Systematic Review: 241
Us
Classific Safety Displac Just
e
Person
Priv Account ation of and
ement
ice
of
hood
acy ability
Individu Certifi of
Sys
For
als
cation Labor
tem
ce
69
51 45
38
35
27
15
5
*Citations can appear in more than one section
The gaps are organized into eight thematic families based on
an empirically updated version of Calo’s taxonomy. It is important to
remember that the gaps described in this section are the result of a
systematic review and not a comprehensive or exhaustive effort.
Experts in each of the fields represented in this work will probably find
that significant events or arguments in the governance of AI are
excluded. This limitation likely affects the veracity of information and
analysis presented in the following sections.
A. Accountability
Entrusting AI applications with autonomous decision-making
capabilities will lead to pecuniary and non-pecuniary harms requiring
remedy.34 Accountability for the decisions of a consumer-grade AI
application depends on the degree of operator control, the existence of
an umbilical cord to the producer, and whether a product’s ecosystem
is closed or open to third parties.35 These variables determine who
responds to the decisions of an AI agent. In this debate, the literature

34

See e.g., Joanna J. Bryson, Mihailis E. Diamantis & Thomas D. Grant, Of,
For, and by the People: The Legal Lacuna of Synthetic Persons, 25 ARTIF.
INTELL. L. 273 (2017); Sabine Gless, Emily Silverman & Thomas Weigend,
If Robots Cause Harm, Who is to Blame? Self-driving Cars and Criminal
Liability, 19 NEW CRIM. L. REV. INT. INTERDISCIP. J. 412 (2016); Leon E.
Wein, Responsibility of Intelligent Artifacts: Toward an Automation
Jurisprudence, 6 HARV. J.L. TECH. 103 (1992).
35
Jack Boeglin, The Costs of Self-driving Cars: Reconciling Freedom and
Privacy with Tort Liability in Autonomous Vehicle Regulation, 17 YALE J.L.
TECH. 171 (2015); Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV. 571, 573
(2010) (See Section 2 discussing the difference between a connected and
disconnected automated vehicle).
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dedicates most of its attention to autonomous vehicles (AVs), a
technology that promises to reduce accidents caused by human error.36
AVs serve as a good proxy for determining the accountability
of AI applications because they share similar accountable parties (i.e.,
operators, owners, manufacturers, the AI application itself, and
government). However, their usefulness is limited by a unique
regulatory context. All vehicles, including AVs, are under the
jurisdiction of state and federal law. Through the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the federal government
establishes guidelines of required safety equipment. For instance, the
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) dictate the
characteristics of breaks that are activated by a person’s foot, manual
turn signals, visual alerts, and the position of the rearview mirror.37
Meanwhile, the 50 jurisdictions of state motor vehicle agencies are
responsible for standards on the licensing, registration, traffic law
enforcement, safety inspections, infrastructure, and insurance and
liability regulations.38
The six regulatory gaps in this section divide the frontiers of
accountability into two parties: individuals and the private sector via
manufacturers (see Table 9).

36
See e.g., Mark Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles: State Tort
Liability, Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation (2017);
Nidhi Kalra, James M. Anderson, Karlyn D. Stanley, Paul Sorensen,
Constantine Samaras & Oluwatobi A. Oluwatola, Autonomous Vehicle
Technology: A Guide for Policymakers (2016),
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR443-2.html; Todd Litman,
Autonomous Vehicle Implementation Predictions, IMPLICATIONS FOR
TRANSPORT PLANNING (2017), http://www.vtpi.org/avip.pdf; B.W. Smith,
Human Error as a Cause of Vehicle Crashes (2013),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/12/human-error-cause-vehiclecrashes.
37
Daniel A. Crane, Kyle D. Logue & Bryce C. Pilz, A Survey of Legal Issues
Arising from the Deployment of Autonomous and Connected Vehicles, 23
MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 191, 211 (2016).
38
Geistfeld, supra note 36, at 1676.
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Table 9 - Regulatory Gaps in Accountability
Issue
Regulatory
Type
of Government Time
Gap
Gaps
Level
Frame
Targeting
User
State
Future
(Over)
Present
Individuals Owner
Uncertainty
State
+
Future
Malpractice
Uncertainty
State
Future
Manufacturing
and
Design Obsolescence State
Future
Defects
Calibrating
Firms
Liability
Uncertainty
State
Future
Exposure
Connected vs.
Federal
+
Disconnected Uncertainty
Future
State
Vehicles
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Type of AI
Application
Application
Application
Application
Application
Application

1. Individuals
Accountability at the personal level is represented by three
scenarios. Individuals can serve as a technology’s users, its legally
recognized owner, or as a professional practitioner with a fiduciary
responsibility to care for a delimited population.
a. User
Users of AI applications are embodied by drivers of AVs, who
are under the jurisdiction of policymakers in 50 states with the remit of
defining the legal basis for operating this technology.39 Although states
39

Id. Interestingly, some states allow non-humans to be considered drivers.
See generally Daniel Lenth, Chapter 570: Paving the Way for Autonomous
Vehicles, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 778 (2013); Bryant Walker Smith,
Automated Vehicles are Probably Legal in the United States, 1 TX A&M L.
REV. 411 (2014). Two examples are:
• Michigan: “Person” means every natural person, firm,
copartnership, association, or corporation and their legal successors.
MICH. VEH. CODE § 257 (2016).
• California: “Person” includes a natural person, firm, copartnership,
association, limited liability company, or corporation CAL. VEH.
CODE § 470 (2017).
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are divided between those with and without AV-specific regulation, 40
it is possible to find the same regulatory gap of targeting in both (overinclusion). Either type of state does not discriminate between
individuals operating vehicles of distinct capabilities, which leads to a
targeting regulatory gap of over-inclusion. In other words, current
regulations treat users of all vehicles equally, despite features that
eliminate human interaction with its controls.41
b. Owner
Accountability for AVs is not derived solely from driving;
ownership can generate liability.42 Scholars underscore a regulatory
gap of uncertainty regarding what model of AV responsibility owners
will face when their property is responsible for harm. Analogies
between current practices that cover organic (dogs and horses) and nonorganic (elevators) entities illustrate the range of possibilities for
attributing accountability. Each analogy offers a different model for
how AV owners will account for their property when a harm occurs.
For instance, animals share some characteristics of completely
autonomous vehicle.43 Neither have a legal personality, both are
considered property, can make decisions autonomously, and may cause
injury or damage to third parties.44 If AVs fell under the regulations of
dogs, owners would either be subject to a regimen where an injured
party has the onus of proving that an owner knew, or should have
With respect to the Federal government, the NHTSA has made it clear that a
completely autonomous system “is the equivalent of a human driver for
federal regulatory purposes” See Mark A. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for
Autonomous Vehicles: State Tort Liability, Automobile Insurance, and
Federal Safety Regulation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1611 (2017).
40
See generally Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably
Legal in the United States, 411 TX A&M L. REV. 411 (2014); Minn. Stat §
169.011 (2018), https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/169.011; W. Perry
Hicks & Alan J. Ponce, SB 219 - Autonomous Vehicles, 34 GA. ST. L. REV.
231 (2017); Adeel Lari, Frank Douma & Ify Onyiah, Self-driving Vehicles
and Policy Implications: Current Status of Autonomous Vehicle
Development and Minnesota Policy Implications, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. TECH.
735 (2015).
41
See generally Tracy Hresko Pearl, Fast & Furious: The Misregulation of
Driverless Cars, 73 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 19 (2017).
42
See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70
N.C.L. REV. 1231 (1991).
43
See generally Smith, supra note 40.
44
Sophia H. Duffy & Jamie Patrick Hopkins, Sit, Stay, Drive: The Future of
Autonomous Car Liability, 16 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 453, 453 (2013).
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known, of the technology’s history of erratic behavior or one where it
bears responsibility regardless of the technology’s past behavior (one
bite rule vs. strict liability).45
On the other hand, a comparison could be made between
owners of horses and semi-AVs in that an animal’s owners are liable
for accidents when they do not verify that a rider has the skills to
control an animal.46 If this analogy is followed, liability would depend
on owners confirming that a driver is knowledgeable of a semi-AV’s
controls and its approach to traffic. Without standardization in the
market, drivers are confronted with learning driving paradigms and
controls from a wide variety of manufacturers, while owners need to
effectively test this knowledge.47
A mechanical parallel to the completely AV is the elevator. In
this technology, passengers have no control over how they reach their
destination.48 When an accident occurs, the consensus in the legal
system is that owners and maintenance companies share responsibility
for an elevator user’s well-being.49 Each of these analogies offers a
different model for how AV owners will account for their property
when a harm occurs. Because of this, it is unclear what path
policymakers will take in scoping the responsibility of individuals that
acquire AI-powered applications.
c. Malpractice
Lastly, malpractice is the act of “negligence or incompetence”
by a professional that fails to follow the common standards expected
45

Coulter Boeschen, “One-Bite” vs. Strict Liability Rules for Dog Bite
Injury Cases, ALLLAW https://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/personalinjury/one-bite-strict-liability-dog-bite.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2021);
Duffy and Hopkins, supra note 44, at 461; Legal Information Institute, Onebite Rule, WEX, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/one-bite_rule (last visited
Oct. 30, 2021).
46
David King, Putting the Reins on Autonomous Vehicle Liability: Why
Horse Accidents are the Best Common Law Analogy, 19 N.C.J.L. & TECH.
127, 152 (2017).
47
Harry Surden & Mary-Anne Williams, Technological Opacity,
Predictability, and Self-Driving Cars, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 172
(2016).
48
King, supra note 46, at 135.
49
Zach Matthews & Christopher K. Jones, Defending the First Wave:
Autonomous Trucking and the Death of Driver Negligence?, TRUCKING LAW
(2015), at 61, available at https://www.sandsanderson.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/FTD-1512-Matthews-Jones.pdf.
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from their community of practice and is the proximate cause of
damages to a person (e.g., client or patient).50 Practitioners in the
medical and legal industries (these professions are governed by state
bodies) will face the regulatory gap of uncertainty concerning the use
of AI applications to aid their decision-making. Scholars in the
systematic review believe there will be a transition period where the
evolution of these systems causes a regulatory gap of uncertainty by
placing practitioners in a dilemma.51 One where they face malpractice
lawsuits if they rely on their experience and disregard the
recommendations of an AI system or vice versa.52 Regardless of their
choices, professionals may be blamed for negligent practice and left
without direction as to the most appropriate or legal action.
2. Firms
Firms face regulatory gaps in three areas: manufacturing and
design defects, calibrating liability exposure, and differentiating
between connected vs. disconnected technologies.
a. Manufacturing and Design Defects
The introduction of completely AVs in the car park possibly
denotes a transition in the accountability of accidents from individuals
to manufacturers.53 The literature in this section reveals that this
application of AI generates the regulatory gap of obsolescence because
it alters the cost of enforcing policies meant to protect victims of harms.
If consumers had access to this technology, the most discussed

50

Malpractice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Steven J. Frank, Tort Adjudication and the Emergence of Artificial
Intelligence Software, 21 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 623, 643-47 (1987).
52
Marshall S. Willick, Professional Malpractice and the Unauthorized
Practice of Professions: Some Legal and Ethical Aspects of the Use of
Computers as Decision-Aids, 12 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 13-16
(1986).
53
See Andrew M. Brown, Blame It on the Machines: How Autonomous
Vehicles Will Impact Allocation of Liability Insurance and the Resulting
Impact on the Legal Community, 95 NCL REV. ADD. 29, 37-40 (2016);
Geistfeld, supra note 36, at 1633; Jeffrey K. Gurney, Sue My Car Not Me:
Products liability and Accidents Involving Autonomous Vehicles, 247 U. ILL.
J.L. TECH. POL’Y 247, 258 (2013); Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving
and Product Liability, MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 36 (2017); Adam Thierer &
Ryan Hagemann, Removing Roadblocks to Intelligent Vehicles and
Driverless Cars, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 339, 360 (2015).
51
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alternative to hold manufacturers responsible is through product
liability claims.54
In practice, claims could become onerous to the point that
accountability is not pursued for non-major accidents, and, in criminal
cases, guilty parties may escape punishment. The reason for this is that
AVs are made up of hardware and software components. Hardware
failures largely fall within the scope of existing policies and do not
generate regulatory gaps.55 Software is a different story. Breakdowns
in software raise accountability questions because of the need to settle
who is responsible for a malfunction or a decision that causes pecuniary
or non-pecuniary harm.56 Specifically, as will be explained below,
manufacturing and design defects are two vectors that consumers could
pursue for restitution of harms from AV manufacturers, or any AI
application for that matter, due to software issues. In this case, the
regulatory gap of obsolescence originates in how these alternatives
substantially alter the cost of consumers that seek justice.
Take, for example, non-major accidents. At present, it is
relatively straightforward for the justice system to determine what
driver is at fault and request that the harm be repaired. With completely
AVs, proving a manufacturing or design defect involves significant

54

See Jessica S. Brodsky, Autonomous Vehicle Regulation: How an
Uncertain Legal Landscape may Hit the Brakes on Self-Driving Cars, 31
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 851, 863-864 (2016); Brown, supra note 53, at 25859; Amir Khoury, Intellectual Property Rights for Hubots: On the Legal
Implications of Human-like Robots as Innovators and Creators, 35
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 635, 646 (2016); Smith, supra note 53 at 37-38;
John W. Terwilleger, Navigating the Road Ahead: Florida’s Autonomous
Vehicle Statute and Its Effect on Liability, 89 FLA. BAR J. 26, 34 (2015),
https://www.floridabar.org/news/tfbjournal/?durl=%2FDIVCOM%2FJN%2FJNJournal01.nsf%2FAuthor%2FBF
FA213CCE8AA5B085257E6C0047DB90.
55
Geistfeld, supra note 36 at 1623-24.
56
Gabriel Hallevy, I, Robot–I, Criminal”—When Science Fiction Becomes
Reality: Legal Liability of AI Robots Committing Criminal Offenses, 22
SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 14-15 (2010) (hereinafter "Hallevy I");
Gabriel Hallevy, The Criminal Liability of Artificial Intelligence EntitiesFrom Science Fiction to Legal Social Control, 4 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J.
171, 183 (2010) (hereinafter "Hallevy II"); George S. Cole, Tort Liability for
Artificial Intelligence and Expert Systems, 10 COMPUTER/L.J. 127, 161
(1990).
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effort and cost.57 Without the means to cover these expenses, victims
of relatively low-cost accidents could be left to cover these claims outof-pocket.58
The same is true with criminal liability. If a product killed an
individual, it is unlikely that a programmer or representative of the
manufacturing company would be jailed due to their role in their
design.59 For them to be held negligently responsible, courts would
have to establish that these individuals should have known that the
criminal actions of the AI agents were a “natural, probable
consequence” beyond a reasonable doubt.60 As there appears to be
limited to no outlet to enforce liability, policies meant to provide justice
become obsolete.
b. Calibrating Liability Exposure
The regulatory gap of uncertainty is encountered in the
guidelines that define a firm’s accountability for harms caused by AVs
and its impact on how they self-regulate their liability exposure.61 If
state governments select a regimen of manufacturer strict liability,
products could be programmed to minimize the resources needed to
settle a claim. Firms would program products to favor: damage to
vehicles that are less expensive; strike motorcyclist/bicyclist wearing a
helmet as opposed to those without one (because they are likely to
sustain fewer injuries); or sacrifice one passenger over a school bus full
of children.62 This calculus changes in a world where contributory
negligence is taken into consideration, a determination where courts
assess if victims contributed to the accident. In these cases, it is possible
57
See Robert W. Peterson, New Technology-Old Law: Autonomous Vehicles
and California's Insurance Framework, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1341,
1355 (2012); Andrea Renda, Ethics, Algorithms and Self-Driving Cars–a
CSI of the ‘Trolley Problem’ 1, 11 (2018); David C. Vladeck, Machines
Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L.
REV. 117, 147-48 (2014).
58
F. Patrick Hubbard, Sophisticated Robots: Balancing Liability, Regulation,
and Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1865-66 (2014).
59
Cole, supra note 56.
60
See Hallevy I, supra note 56; Hallevy II, supra note 56.
61
See generally Bryan Casey, Amoral Machines, or: How Roboticists Can
Learn to Stop Worrying and Love the Law, 111 NW. U.L REV. 1347 (2016)
(comparing and contrasting the impact of regulation on how firms selfregulate their liabilities through a mechanism known as liability
minimization).
62
See Renda, supra note 57, at 8.
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to think of a scenario where an AV would prefer to impact a group of
pedestrians that illegally crosses the road and are responsible for the
accident, then damage property to avoid them.63
c. Connected vs. Disconnected Vehicles
The last regulatory gap faced by firms is uncertainty. It is
confronted when distinguishing a firms’ liability between completely
AVs that are connected or disconnected from their control.64
Disconnected AVs do not communicate with the manufacturer once
they leave the factory floor.65 They will evolve in unique ways over
time, some of them unforeseeable.66 Connected products have an
umbilical cord to the manufacturer, who can theoretically manage,
detect, and correct any software defect or control its decision-making.67
Considering their important differences, manufacturers lack certainty
as to how these vehicles will be distinguished under the law, if at all.
Furthermore, policymakers need to confirm whether the
federal government will oversee this issue as a matter of regulating
equipment under the FMVSS or if states have jurisdiction under their
remit to enforce regulations related to road behavior. In particular,
firms require regulatory clarity as to the limits of their accountability
or if insurance-like protection will be available to cover cases of
hacking, miscommunication, and manufacturing/design defects.68
Although firms in the transportation sector are the focus of this
literature, applications of AI in all sectors are subject to how

63

Casey, supra note 61, at 1358-59.
See generally Boeglin, supra note 35 at 175; see also Terwilleger, supra
note 54; Firms include entities such as “automotive manufacturers,
component suppliers, software providers, data providers, fleet operators, and
infrastructure managers, among others.”
65
Jack Boeglin, The Costs of Self-driving Cars: Reconciling Freedom and
Privacy with Tort Liability in Autonomous Vehicle Regulation, 17 YALE J.L.
TECH. 171 (2015); Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV. 571, 573
(2010).
66
See e.g., Renda, supra note 57, at 12; Paulius Čerka, Jurgita Grigienė &
Gintarė Sirbikytė, Liability for Damages Caused by Artificial Intelligence,
31 COMPUTER L.& SECURITY REV. 376, 386 (2015).
67
See Boeglin, supra note 65, at 573.
68
See e.g. Crane, supra note 37, at 240; Geistfeld, supra note 36, at 1662;
Jeffrey K Gurney, Driving into the Unknown: Examining the Crossroads of
Criminal Law and Autonomous Vehicles, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L.& POL’Y 393,
410 (2015); Renda, supra note 57, at 11.
64
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policymakers at the federal and state level differentiate the liability
between products with and without an umbilical cord.
B. Classification of Individuals
AI methods and applications enable the processing of vast
quantities of information for the purpose of labeling individuals in a
manner that affects their lives. This section detects regulatory gaps in
cases where these labels are implemented by authorities in
consequential decision-making acts or when they generate inequality
(See Table 10).69
In this article, consequential decision-making gaps are defined
as instances where government entities utilize AI to classify people in
ways that weaken the Constitutional protections of due process and
probable cause. These protections limit authorities from indiscriminate
use of power, and, in many cases, AI has increased the difficulty in
defending them.70 The second part of this section focuses on the term
inequality in application, which describes gaps where protected
classifications of people are a factor in decision-making.

69

See Calo, supra note 2, at 421.
See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Plausible Cause: Explanatory Standards in
the Age of Powerful Machines, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1249, 1257-58 (2017).
70
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Table 10 - Regulatory Gaps in the Classification of Individuals
Issue

Conseque
ntial
DecisionMaking

Inequality
in
Applicati
on

Regulator
y Gap

Type of Govern
Gaps
ment
Level

Due
Process

Obsolesc
ence

Probable
Cause

Obsolesc
ence

Algorithm
ic Bias

Obsolesc
ence

Intellectua
l
Discrimin
ation

Uncertain
ty

Tim
e
Fra
me

Federal + Pres
State
ent
Federal
State
Local
Federal
State
Local
Federal

Type of
AI

Applicat
ion
+
Method

+
Pres
+
ent

Method

+
Pres
+
ent

Method

Futu
re

Applicat
ion

1. Consequential Decision-Making
Consequential decision-making regulatory gaps are found in
cases where government entities rely on AI to classify people in ways
that weaken their rights, such as the Constitutional protections of due
process and probable cause.
a. Due Process
Due process is a shield against the deprivation of rights or
entitlements in the form of reception of notice, ability to redress
grievances, or have a neutral arbiter when AI is used.71 In fact,
authorities may impinge due process rights via this technology in a
variety of settings. State and federal entities delegate authority to
applications of AI that catalyze regulatory obsolescence by placing

71

Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative
Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147 (2016);
Legal Information Institute, Procedural due process, WEX,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/procedural_due_process (last visited Oct.
26, 2021).
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individuals in a consequential status without providing notice or giving
them an opportunity to redress a decision to a neutral party.72
At the state level, government management systems have
mislabeled people as not paying child-support or incorrectly terminated
benefits such as Medicaid or food stamps.73 These acts lead to wage
garnishments, credit bureau reports, revocation of driving and
professional licenses, homelessness, or denial of medical attention.74 In
some cases, correcting these mistakes has either been very difficult or
impossible.
At the federal level, classified and non-classified systems (e.g.,
E-Verify, the Terrorist Watch List, and the No-Fly List) comb through
databases that connect personally identifiable information with
surveillance from the intelligence community.75 Similar to their state
counterparts, decisions by these systems alter the livelihoods of
affected parties without any notice and limited means to redress an
erroneous classification.76 At the same time, methods of AI can infer
complex relationships, but these capabilities have a tradeoff in that
their accuracy comes at the cost of explainability.77 Authorities can
offer the justice system a description of how these results were
processed, but they cannot pinpoint the variables taken into
consideration to reach a particular conclusion.78

72

See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due
process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 28 (2014); Kevin
Miller, Total Surveillance, Big Data, and Predictive Crime Technology:
Privacy’s Perfect Storm, 19 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 105, 137-38 (2014).
73
Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U.L REV.
1249, 1281 (2007).
74
Id. at 1276.
75
Id. at 1266; see also Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV.
1735, 1764 (2015).
76
See generally Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 71; Miller, supra note 72.
77
See Peter Margulies, Surveillance By Algorithm: The NSA, Computerized
Intelligence Collection, and Human Rights, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1045, 1069
(2016); Lina Zhou et al., A Comparison of Classification Methods for
Predicting Deception in Computer-Mediated Communication, 20 J. OF
MANAG. INF. SYST. 139, 158 (2014),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/07421222.2004.11045779?ne
edAccess=true.
78
Margulies, supra note 77, at 1069.
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b. Probable Cause
Probable cause contemplates that any arrest, search, or warrant
must articulate the facts that connect an individual to the commitment
of a crime or its planning.79 When an individual is arrested or searched,
authorities are required to articulate a justification for their actions.
These may include evidence gathered through wiretaps, financial
transactions, and social media postings. 80 If officers depend solely on
AI methods-based predictive policing tools for their decision-making,
such an explanation may be impossible.81 Instead, they acquire a
predictive analysis emanating from diverse sources such as
“expressions of political opinion in chat rooms, a recent report of a lost
passport (indicating an attempt to conceal a visit to a terrorist training
camp in Afghanistan or Pakistan), attempts to use or deploy a common
encryption technique, and patronage (picked up through public video
surveillance and facial recognition software) of a store specializing in
pre-paid cell phones.”82 Although it could be argued that connecting
patterns among dispersed databases would have eluded a human
analyst, the Constitution affords individuals the right to understand the
reasons for their arrest or search.
Having law enforcement depend on these tools increases the
obsolescence of the protections conferred by probable cause and
reasonable suspicion in several ways.83 First, the vast amount of data
available on individuals, especially when incorrect, makes it easier to
arrive at probable cause and weakens Fourth Amendment rights.84
Second, these applications only consider data in a format that the
79

Brennan-Marquez, supra note 70, at 1253; Legal Information Institute,
Procedural due process, WEX,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/procedural_due_process (last visited Oct.
26, 2021); Miller, supra note 72, at 126; Omer Tene, A Bew Harm Matrix for
Cybersecurity Surveillance, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 391, 395 (2014).
80
Margulies, supra note 77, at 1064-65.
81
Lindsey Barrett, Reasonably Suspicious Algorithms: Predictive Policing at
the United States Border, 41 NYU REV. L. & SOC. CHANG. 327, 341 (2017).
82
Margulies, supra note 77 at 1070.
83
Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth
Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 56 (2014); Laura Myers, Allen Parrish &
Alexis Williams, Big Data and the Fourth Amendment: Reducing
Overreliance on the Objectivity of Predictive Policing, 8 FED. CTS. L. REV.
231, 234 (2014).
84
Barrett, supra note 81, at 345; Margaret Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 690 (2017); Joh, supra note 83, 38; Miller, supra
note 72, at 125-26.
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system can comprehend, which may exclude exculpatory evidence.85
Third, it reinforces the biases inherent in these systems.86 Fourth, it
serves as an excuse by officers to supplant their training, observation
skills, or intuition and depend solely on the technology. Although this
behavior has been deemed illegal by the Supreme Court, officers can
shield themselves by generating a fake justification for an arrest after
the fact. 87
At the core of these rights is the requirement that authorities
justify their decisions or provide individuals with the tools to question
them. An obligation that, if certain methods or applications of AI are
employed, cannot be fulfilled. Hence, this technology may alter
society’s ability to enforce these rights, which leads to a regulatory gap
of obsolescence.
2. Inequality in Application
In this article, inequality in application is a term that describes
cases of regulatory gaps where variables that safeguard against
discrimination are a factor in decision-making. The cases below will
examine instances where governments and the private sector are barred
from carrying out algorithmic bias by relying on demographic
characteristics in delimited circumstances prescribed by the law.
a. Algorithmic Bias
This section describes two cases of regulatory gaps where
inequality in application were found in the systematic review. In the
first one, AI methods generate a regulatory gap of obsolescence by
facilitating the concealed use of protected variables in discriminatory
activities. AI methods disrupt traditional grounds for identifying
discrimination, potentially making their enforcement obsolete. They do
so by masking an illegal discriminative practice. Instead of relying on
protected variables as a determining factor in a decision, entities can
program their systems so that the importance of protected variables are

85

See e.g., David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal
Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C.D.L. REV. 653,
659-60 (2017); Michael L Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion
Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 897 (2015).
86
Barrett, supra note 81, at 340-41; Miller, supra note 72, at 122-23.
87
See e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119; Miller, supra note 72, at 128.
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hidden via limitless data points and models that change dynamically
through time.88
Entities that desire to discriminate can do so through several
vectors in the design of an algorithm.89 Although they cannot predict
the outcome of their model, programmers can define output variables
that advantage or disadvantage certain groups.90 They may also feed a
model with biased historical training data that enhances the likelihood
of statistical relationships with a discriminatory outcome.91 Moreover,
if proof of intent is needed in a discrimination suit, it would be difficult
to assert the malice of a model for which it is impossible to determine,
a priori, what relationships will be found.92
b. Intellectual Discrimination
In the second case, the regulatory gap of uncertainty is
witnessed in the haphazard application of sentencing guidelines that
differentiate criminal punishment of individuals who target vulnerable
populations. This particular scenario focuses on cognitive capabilities,
which depend on our baseline intelligence and how it is shaped by the
environment. This is known as the interaction of nature and nurture.
Brenner and Hubbard speculate of a future where this is no longer the

88

Tom Baker & Benedict G. C. Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advice Across the
Financial Services Industry (2017); Hu, supra note 84, at 664; Richard D.
Taylor, The Next Stage of US Communications Policy: The Emerging
Embedded Infosphere, 41 TELECOMM. POLICY 1039, 1046 (2017); Omer
Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Judged by the Tin Man: Individual Rights in the
Age of Big Data, 11 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 351, 356 (2013);
David C. Vladeck, Consumer Protection in an Era of Big Data Analytics, 42
OHIO N.U.L REV. 493, 495 (2016).
89
Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 88, at 358.
90
Solon Barocas & Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104
CALIF. L. REV. 671, 671 (2016); Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust
But Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the Law, 31(1) HARVARD. J. OF L. &
TECH. 1, 22 (2017); Lehr & Ohm, supra note 85, at 703.
91
Robert Atkinson, ’It’s Going to Kill Us!’And Other Myths About the
Future of Artificial Intelligence, NCSSS J. 8, 10 (2016); Lehr & Ohm, supra
note 85, at 703-04; Benjamin L. W. Sobel, Artificial Intelligence’s Fair Use
Crisis 41(1) COL. J. OF L. & THE ARTS 45, 92 (2017); Taylor, supra note 88,
at 1045.
92
Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 71, at 193; Marcy Peek, Passing Beyond
Identity on the Internet: Espionage & (and) Counterespionage in the Internet
Age, 28 VT. L. REV. 91, 101 (2003).
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case, a world where the private sector develops an application of AI
allowing consumers to upgrade their cognition.93
Enhancing humans opens the door for one group to take
advantage of the other. To protect vulnerable victims, or individuals
without access to this application of AI, federal sentencing guidelines
impart harsher penalties to perpetrators based on a limited set of
characteristics.94 The regulatory gap observed in this scenario is the
uncertainty of whether courts that hear cases of cognitive
discrimination facilitated by this futuristic AI application will have a
restrictive or permissive approach in applying these guidelines.
Courts with restrictive views will limit the application of
punishment enhancements to characteristics that victims cannot control
and that hamper their ability to defend themselves. Permissive courts
take advantage of the open-ended “otherwise particularly susceptible”
standard to cover a wide gamut of vulnerabilities and apply them more
liberally to cases outside the scope of the age or mental and physical
condition restrictions.95
Although this scenario speculates about a technology yet to be
discovered, its implications on social equity are significant. With the
presence of upgraded individuals, treating every person as an “equal

93

See generally Susan W. Brenner, Humans and Humans+: Technological
Enhancement and Criminal Responsibility, 19 BUJ SCI. TECH. L. 215, 220
(2013); F. Patrick Hubbard, Do Androids Dream: Personhood and
Intelligent Artifacts, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 405, 436 (2010).
94
“For purposes of subsection (b), “vulnerable victim” means a person (A)
who is a victim of the offense of conviction and any conduct for which the
defendant is accountable under §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct); and (B) who is
unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or who is
otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.
Subsection (b) applies to offenses involving an unusually vulnerable victim
in which the defendant knows or should have known of the victim’s unusual
vulnerability. The adjustment would apply, for example, in a fraud case in
which the defendant marketed an ineffective cancer cure or in a robbery in
which the defendant selected a handicapped victim. But it would not apply in
a case in which the defendant sold fraudulent securities by mail to the
general public and one of the victims happened to be senile. Similarly, for
example, a bank teller is not an unusually vulnerable victim solely by virtue
of the teller’s position in a bank” United States Sentencing Commission,
Guidelines Manual (2018) at 346,
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelinesmanual/2018/GLMFull.pdf.
95
Id. at 145.
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before the law actually creates opportunities for inequality.”96 This is
because individuals with superior capabilities can take advantage of
their cognitive skills to trick vulnerable normal people by convincing
them to sign complex contracts or participate in unfair schemes.97 The
regulatory gap of uncertainty will be observed in the conflicting
application of sentencing guidelines by the justice system meant to
disincentivize harm against “standard” humans by their enhanced
counterparts.
C. Displacement of Labor
Demand for human labor is a historical constant. Society has
benefited from the payment or coercion of individuals to deliver their
physical or cognitive outputs for a purpose. Since AI was first
introduced to the public, questions arose about its role in modifying the
demand for labor. They centered on the social repercussions of
machines capable of combining strength with cognitive abilities equal
or superior to that of humans.
The systematic review evinced few examples of regulatory
gaps in the displacement of labor literature. Those identified center on
the role of applications and methods of AI in changing the demand for
labor and its effects on the provision of government services (see Table
11). They contemplate speculative scenarios where these services, in
the form of public education and the social safety net, are unable to
cope with the needs of the population.
Table 11 - Regulatory Gaps in Displacement of Labor
Issue

Public
Programs

96
97

Regulatory Type of Government Time
Type of AI
Gap
Gaps
Level
Frame

Public
Education

Novelty

Federal
+
Future
State + Local

Application

Social
Safety Net

Novelty

Federal
+
Future
State + Local

Application

Brenner, supra note 93, at 70.
Id.
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1. Public Education
Public education is a core function of society that involves
every level of government (local, state, and federal). Its objective is to
prepare individuals with skills that translate to positive labor outcomes.
The regulatory gap identified in this case is novelty. In the short term,
experts believe that the education system is unlikely to face a negative
outcome.98 In the medium to long term, this can drastically change.
Scholars posit that the emergence of AI applications able to replace
humans could force authorities to rethink how the education system
adapts to meet the needs of the market.99
The main issue in the delivery of education is the speed with
which the demand for skills may change. As it stands today, the
majority of U.S. students receive training in phases limited to the first
two decades of their lives. Considering that the emerging applications
and methods of AI will continuously adapt and improve, limiting the
provision of technical skills to the initial stages of a person’s life
hampers their ability to adapt to technologies that did not exist when
they received training.100 Therefore, policymakers must consider new
educational models to address the capabilities gap that American
workers may confront.
2. Social Safety Net
On the other hand, each level of government serves their
constituents with an assortment of benefits and services (e.g., medical
or job-related) when they are unable to procure an income. Referred to
as the social safety net in this review, scholars mentioned in this section
posit a future where AI is the catalyst for spectacularly rapid changes
in the labor market. These changes lead to the mass displacement of
laborers to the point of burdening government programs to levels for
which they are unprepared. Under these conditions, the literature
documented below contends that the influence of AI in the workforce
98
Lee Rainie & Janna Anderson, The Future of Jobs and Jobs Training,
PEW RES. CENT. (2017), available at http//www. pewinternet.
org/2017/05/03/the-future-of-jobs-and-jobs-training. Rainie and Anderson
canvassed 1,408 experts. 70% of them expressed a belief that the market,
and its institutions, will adapt to meet the demand for labor.
99
See e.g., Tim Kane, The Terrifying Liberation of Labor, 20 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 815 (2006).
100
Id. at 832
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could force policymakers to consider new models to deliver an
effective social safety net, thus generating a novelty regulatory gap.
In the long term, job replacement could drive all skill levels
(even high-skilled ones) out of employment. This may happen if the
complexity of systems increases to the point that no human is able to
operate, maintain, or keep up with AI-based technologies.101 As new
jobs emerge at a rapid pace, an accelerating skills mismatch would
impede most workers from training at a rate that meets demand,
convincing employers to further automate tasks.102 Therefore, there is
a non-zero chance that a sizable proportion of the population does not
adapt and requires a new model of public assistance than the one
available. The current state of the safety net is not designed to fully
support a massive number of families in a future where they are unable
to gain employment in the medium to long-term.
D. Justice System
A functioning court system is the basis for the pursuit of
justice. This section surveys the literature on the implications of
methods and applications of AI in the operation of the judicial branch.
The regulatory gaps identified in the articles reviewed fall within one
of two buckets (see Table 12).

101

Michael Gemignani, Laying Down the Law to Robots, 21 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1045, 1052 (1983).
102
Lewis D. Solomon, The Microelectronics Revolution, Job Displacement,
and the Future of Work: A Policy Commentary, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 65, 73
(1987).
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The first bucket centers on the Daubert standard for admitting
scientific testimony by an expert witness. Below, readers will find two
types of arguments. Those stating that the under-inclusion of this
standard may limit the ability of judges to effectively assess how AI is
utilized in the courtroom. Conversely, there are those that contemplate
a future where courts are uncertain about the applicability of the
standard to AI-based expert witnesses.
The second bucket discusses a future scenario where judges
are replaced by AI agents. This transition could change the nature of
the common law system by eliminating the development of new
judicial precedent. Scholars argue that without judges, all cases will
rely on the database of existing precedent and no new precedent is
created to face unanticipated circumstances.
1. Judicial Vetting of AI
A fundamental element of the judicial system is the evaluation
of evidence. All courts at the federal, and some at the state level, follow
the Daubert standard for admitting scientific testimony by an expert
witness.103 The judicial vetting of methods and applications of AI as
103

Legal Information Institute, Daubert Standard (2019),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/daubert_standard.
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evidence generates the regulatory gaps of targeting and uncertainty.
Whether this evidence is presented at the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISA), pre-trial discovery, or as an expert opinion
generated by an AI application, the literature emphasizes scenarios
where the Daubert standard is either not currently applied or there is
uncertainty as to how it will be interpreted.
a. FISA Courts
In the opinion of Hu, a targeting gap (under-inclusion) is
confronted by judges in the FISA court system.104 This body oversees
the electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence gathering by
agencies in the executive branch such as the NSA.105 The objective of
the Daubert standard is to assess the admissibility of expert testimony.
FISA judges are not subject to Daubert and, because of this, they cannot
hold government experts to the same standard utilized in other courts
to verify the validity of claims about AI-based methods and
applications used by applicants.106 The under-inclusion of this standard
means that these judges could be making ill or mis-informed decisions
when assessing the approval for error-prone technologies that generate
evidence to criminally implicate individuals.
b. Pre-Trial Discovery
Pre-trial discovery is a process where legal counsel for the
defendant and plaintiff exchange evidence to prepare for a trial.107
During this phase of deliberations, the implementation of an AI
application, denominated as a computer-assisted review, can catalyze
disagreements between parties.108 These disagreements are subject to
resolution by a judge, and in the opinion of Waxse and Yoakum-Kriz,
there is a regulatory gap of targeting (under-inclusion) because the
104

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Agency, About the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (2019), https://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/about-foreignintelligence-surveillance-court (hereinafter "FISA"); Margaret Hu, Small
Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 773
(2014).
105
FISA, supra note 104.
106
Hu, supra note 104.
107
Legal Information Institute, Discovery (2019),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/discovery.
108
David J. Waxse & Brenda Yoakum-Kriz, Experts on Computer-Assisted
Review: Why Federal Rule of Evidence 702 Should Apply to Their Use, 52
WASHBURN L.J. 207, 213 (2012).
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rules of evidence do not apply in this phase of the process, which denies
courts the ability to scrutinize AI applications through a Daubert
proceeding.109
c. AI Expert Witnesses
The last regulatory gap in the judicial vetting of evidence is
future-facing. Society is increasingly reliant on technology for
evidence gathering (e.g., breathalyzers, video cameras, genetic testing),
yet it has not faced a scenario where it needs to validate the AI methods
used by non-human expert witnesses in court.110 As envisioned by
Karnow, this future generates a regulatory gap of uncertainty.111 In
other words, it is difficult to predict if the AI methods used by these
“experts,” who have yet to be developed, will be treated the same as
their human counterparts in the justice system.
2. Elimination of New Judicial Precedents
Klingensmith and D’Amato speculate of a future where
humans no longer serve as judges in courtrooms.112 They are replaced
by AI agents who decide the fate of cases based on existing regulations
and precedent. If this scenario occurred, the practice of creating new
judicial precedent would face a regulatory gap of obsolescence since
the authors presume that AI agents would be unable to create new
precedents based on changing social conditions, making this doctrine
irrelevant. Klingensmith and D’Amato suggest that replacing judges
with AI agents would have a perilous effect on the common law
system, ultimately eliminating its ability to update itself.113 They argue
that the lack of human judges would “stagnate” the interpretation of the
law and irrelevant legal doctrines would not be challenged or
overturned, thus hampering the evolution of common law.114

109

Id. at 220.
See Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972 (2016).
111
Curtis E.A. Karnow, The Opinion of Machines, 17 Colum Sci. & Tech. L.
Rev. 136, 139 (2017).
112
See Anthony D’Amato, Can/Should Computers Replace Judges, 11 GA.
L. REV. 1277, 1298 (1976); Mark W. Klingensmith, Computers Laying
down the Law: Will Judges Become Obsolete, 90 FLA. B. J. 80, 82 (2016).
113
Anthony D’Amato, Can/Should Computers Replace Judges, 11 GA. L.
REV. 1277, 1298 (1976).
114
Id.; Mark W. Klingensmith, Computers Laying down the Law: Will
Judges Become Obsolete, 90 FLA. B.J. 80, 82 (2016).
110
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E. Personhood
The rights and responsibilities enjoyed by organic and nonorganic entities have a fluid history.115 The last 200 years are marked
by a decline in the reliance of demographic factors (e.g., sex and race)
to deprive individuals the benefits of personhood.116 At the same time,
rights for non-human entities have expanded (e.g., Freedom of speech
via the Citizens United Supreme Court case), and arguments in favor
of bestowing privileges from the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
Amendments are increasing.117
AI methods and applications benefit from the second trend. As
their capabilities increase, legal distinctions between a human and a
sufficiently autonomous non-human AI agent can become
progressively more difficult to make. Although AI systems have
limited to no rights today, Solum posits that future humans may argue
against the provision of legal personhood to non-biological
counterparts based on their lack of characteristics perceived to be
exclusive to humans: consciousness, free will, emotion, or
intentionality.118 Notwithstanding the ability of AI agents to act as if
they possessed these characteristics, policymakers and the courts will
be the arbiters of what rights bestowed to adult humans are granted to
these entities.119
This section examines the frontier of this debate (see Table 13).
Applications of AI are gradually performing achievements that
complement or substitute humans, thus generating eight regulatory
gaps that challenge our perception of personhood. Intellectual property
is an example. AI agents are capable of creating works and discoveries
115
See generally Hutan Ashrafian, Artificial Intelligence and Robot
Responsibilities: Innovating Beyond Rights, 21 SCI. & ENG. ETHICS 317
(2015); Hubbard, supra note 93.
116
Mark Goldfeder & Yosef Razin, Robotic Marriage and the Law, 10 J.L.
& SOC. DEVIANCE 137, 142-45 (2015).
117
See e.g., Anthony J. Bellia Jr, Contracting with Electronic Agents, 50
EMORY L.J. 1047 (2001); Angelo Guisado, When Harry Met Sallie Mae:
Marriage, Corporate Personhood, and Hyperbole in an Evolving
Landscape, 10 J.L. & SOC. DEVIANCE 123 (2014).
118
A. Michael Froomkin & P. Zak Colangelo, Self-Defense Against Robots
and Drones, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2015); Solum, supra note 42, at 1258.
119
See Hubbard, supra note 93; See Thomas A. Smith, Robot Slaves, Robot
Masters, and the Agency Costs of Artificial Government, 1 CRITERION J.
INNOV. 1 (2016); Solum, supra note 42; Čerka, Grigienė, and Sirbikytė,
supra note 66.
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worthy of protection through copyright and patents, but their underinclusion from regulation leads people to fraudulently attribute
knowledge to undeserving parties or use trade secrets to limit their
dissemination. With freedom of speech, entities such as corporations
have obtained this right because their opinions emanate from groups of
humans. Scholars included in this section express uncertainty about the
limits of expression once the human umbilical cord is cut and AI agents
spread ideas on their own.
Table 13 - Regulatory Gaps in Personhood
Issue
Regulatory
Type
of
Gap
Gaps
Targeting
Copyrights
Intellectual
(Under)
Property
Targeting
Rights
Patents
(Under)
Freedom
of First
Uncertainty
Speech
Amendment
Mens Rea for Targeting
AI Agents
(Under)
Accountability
Punishing AI
Uncertainty
Agents
Commercial
Non-Human
Uncertainty
Agency
Representation
Consent
of
Marriage
Uncertainty
Non-Humans
Protecting
AI
Agent Non-Organic
Uncertainty
Rights
Entities from
Harm

Government Time
Level
Frame

Type of AI

Federal

Present Application

Federal

Present Application

Federal

Present Application

Federal
+
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State
Federal
+
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State + Local

Application
Application

State

Present Application

State

Future

Application

Federal

Future
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It is undeniable that AI agents will commit illegal acts where a
responsible party will face justice. As will be highlighted in this
section, an option highlighted by scholars is to charge AI agents
directly with these crimes. Regulatory gaps within this literature cross
two themes: personhood and accountability. Due to its focus on AI
agents, both gaps dealing with intent to commit a crime and the
punishment of this technology are included in this section.
In commerce, personhood is required to represent the interests
of another individual or entity. Court cases and theoretical exceptions
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to state law in this section have cast doubt on the legality of nonhumans performing these duties. Finally, limitations on marriage
between consenting adults have gradually been removed in the U.S.120
The civil union between a human and non-human could generate a
regulatory gap of uncertainty. In this scenario, policymakers will
debate whether human standards of consent apply to non-humans.
1. Intellectual Property Rights
"[Congress shall have power] to promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries."121
Written when the country was founded, this statement defends
the fruits of intellectual property through the allocation of a monopoly.
These monopolies are known as copyrights and patents. They
incentivize individuals to create and communicate ideas that benefit all
of society. This section will evince how both instruments explicitly
exclude non-humans from obtaining intellectual property rights. This
is true despite the ability of AI agents to generate works or discoveries
that meet the standards required to allocate these rights. The lack of
alternatives for protecting these outputs creates a targeting regulatory
gap. Non-human AI agents are under-included in current policy, which
can lead to undesirable behavior such as the human appropriation of
outputs or the concealment of knowledge that may improve the state of
the art in science and the creative arts.
a. Copyrights
Copyright is a government-mandated monopoly for “original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”122
This policy not only establishes a low bar for an original work, where
no creativity requirement exists, it also presupposes that to receive a
copyright the author must be human.123 This stipulation is the main
120

With the exception of restrictions on unions due to consanguinity.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
122
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2016).
123
See Bruce E, Boyden, Emergent Works, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 377, 381
(2015); Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially
Intelligent Author, STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012); Timothy L. Butler, Can
a Computer be an Author-Copyright Aspects of Artificial Intelligence, 4
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 707, 722 (1981); Evan H. Farr,
121
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barrier for protecting works “authored” by non-human AI agents.
Existing applications of AI are fueling a regulatory gap of targeting
(under-inclusion) because original works that comply with the goal of
the policy cannot be assigned property rights since non-humans are
excluded from receiving this type of protection.
b. Patents
Whereas the threshold of creativity in copyright is “virtually”
absent, a higher standard of scrutiny is applied to patents. Conferring
one entails the discovery of “any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement.”124 The eligibility criteria for patents is clear: only
humans that conceive a discovery can obtain a government-endorsed
monopoly.125 In fact, the definition for the term inventor references an
“individual…[or]…individuals” and, to complete a patent application,
a claimant must declare that they believe “himself or herself to be the
original inventor.”126 Non-humans cannot apply for a patent and, as
excluded matter, any of their discoveries would automatically be
placed in the public domain.127 The regulatory gap of targeting
observed in patents is identical to the one found with copyrights.
There are no legal alternatives to protect discoveries by non-human

Copyrightability of Computer-Created Works, 15 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J, 63, 65 (1989); Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights
in Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1187-88 (1985);
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of Artworks Produced by Creative Robots and Originality: The FormalityObjective Model, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 4-7 (2018).
124
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125
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the Future of Patent Law, 57 B.C.L. REV. 1079, 1096-97 (2016); Ralph D.
Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer
Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1675,
1682-84 (1996); Liza Vertinsky & Todd M. Rice, Thinking About Thinking
Machines: Implications of Machine Inventors for Patent Law, 8 B.U.J. SCI.
& TECH. L. 574, 584-85 (2002), http://www.fsigenetics.com/article/S18724973(07)00173-1/pdf.
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10 LANDSLIDE 16, 22 (2017); Ben McEniery, Physicality and the
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agents through a government monopoly.128 Hence, these outputs are
under-included in the regulation that incentivizes the generation of
new intellectual property.
2. The First Amendment
The First Amendment of the Constitution states that “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press.”129 In its simplest form, the Amendment allows individuals and
groups of people to communicate ideas without the fear of government
censorship. The regulatory gap of uncertainty is confronted when
interpreting the treatment of expressions that are disconnected from the
human umbilical cord. If an autonomous AI agent expresses an idea,
independently from a human, courts will have to determine if it
qualifies for First Amendment protection.130 The systematic review
offers insights into the contrasting opinions of scholars on this issue.
Applications of AI have already received First Amendment
scrutiny. Courts supported the rights of Google and Baidu
programmers in creating algorithms that behave much like editors or
publishers of periodicals when selecting and sorting the information
displayed in search results.131 In these cases, AI applications were
understood as conduits for the opinions of the individuals within these

128

Abbott, supra note 125 at 1096-97; Clifford, supra note 125 at 1682-84.
U S Const., amend. I.
130
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AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION: BUSINESS LAW TODAY (Jul. 20, 2017),
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05_boughman/; Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search
Commission-Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1193 (2007); Brittainy Cavender, The
Personalization Puzzle, 10 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 97, 98 (2017); Seema
Ghatnekar, Injury by Algorithm: A Look Into Google's Liability For
Defamatory Autocompleted
Search Suggestions, 33 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 171, 174 (2012); Toni M.
Massaro, Helen Norton & Margot E Kaminski, SIRI-OUSLY 2.0: What
Artificial Intelligence Reveals about the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L.
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Protection for Search Engine Search Results -- White Paper Commissioned
by Google, 12 UCLA SCH. LAW RES. PAP. No 12-22 (2012) at 8-9.
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firms.132 In other words, the technology serves as an agent of a
human.133
One argument is that speech is limited to qualified speakers,
and what AI agents perform is akin to conduct.134 In this literature,
conduct is behavior only protected by the First Amendment if it
contains an expressive component.135 The burning of the American flag
was considered expressive conduct that denotes disagreement with
policies of the U.S. government.136 If AI output is classified as conduct
that is not expressive or if courts deem that an AI agent does not qualify
as a speaker, it loses constitutional protection.137
Bambauer analyzes whether data can be considered speech.138
She concludes that as long as the output serves to create knowledge or,
as stated by the author, “freedom from intentional or excessive
government restraints on learning something new,” First Amendment
protection should be afforded. 139 Massaro, Norton et al. believe that all
expressions, regardless of their source, should receive protection to
guarantee the free flow of information.140 Wu proposes a more
restrictive approach where not all output of an intelligent non-human
should automatically be protected.141 Only instances where “speech
products” that “are viewed as vessels for the ideas of a speaker, or
whose content has been consciously curated” should fall under the First
Amendment.142
3. Accountability
Historical antecedents exist for assigning animals and nonorganic objects with “deodand” liability (e.g., weapons, railroad
132
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locomotives, and ships) over harms caused to society.143 AI agents are
the newest iteration of this lineage. This section identifies two
regulatory gaps in the literature instigated by society’s desire to hold
this technology accountable for its illegal acts: identifying mens rea for
AI agents and issues with assigning these entities with punishment.
These gaps were not included in the accountability section due to their
relationship to the personhood of AI agents.
a. Mens Rea for AI Agents
It is within the realm of possibility that a crime is committed,
yet no human, or an entity controlled by humans, perpetrated or
prevented it.144 In these cases, there is support among scholars in the
systematic review for holding AI agents responsible for acts that would
be deemed illegal if performed by people.145 The regulatory gap of
targeting (under-inclusion) is witnessed if and when AI agents are
charged for crimes that require proof of mens rea or the intent to
commit a crime. Due to the fact that they lack recognition as a legal
person, one with duties and responsibilities to society, they are not
subject to mens rea standards and cannot be held responsible.
Examples of crimes that could be carried by an AI agent and
require mens rea include market manipulation cases. Humans who
perform practices such as “banging the close, wash trading, or
spoofing” or create algorithms with the intention to incent monopolistic
behavior can have demonstrable mens rea.146 Since AI agents are not
143

Wein, supra note 34 at 118.
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See e.g., Aaron Gevers, Is Johnny Five Alive or Did It Short Circuit: Can
and Should an Artificially Intelligent Machine Be Held Accountable in War
Or Is It Merely a Weapon, 12 RUTGERS J,L, & PUB. POL’Y 384, 386-87
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legal persons, there is no recourse to apply mens rea to similar acts
committed by them. Another example is the accountability for
defamatory speech by an AI agent.147 The Supreme Court found that a
claim of defamation or libel can only be sustained if the defendant can
show culpable intent.148 As with financial crimes, these non-legal
persons are excluded from culpability because of their personhood.
Maintaining the status quo means that an AI application free from
human control would live in a society without the tools to hold it
accountable for its actions.
b. Punishing AI Agents
Economic and non-economic punishment has the purpose of
dissuading humans from committing a crime. The justice system has a
portfolio of penalties applicable to humans or entities under their
control (e.g. firms) when they are judged as guilty (e.g. ranging from a
fine to capital punishment). Monetary compensation is one channel to
satisfy one’s duties to society. For centuries, inanimate objects have
been personified under the precedent of deodand liability.149
Autonomous AI agents are unlike entities subject to deodand liability
because they may not be controlled by humans or have owners
accountable for their actions.
Outside of economic harms, which are resolved by paying a
fine, non-economic harms require the apportionment of justice.
Humans who commit a non-economic crime are essentially subject to
two types of sanctions: imprisonment and capital punishment.150 AI
agents that generate harms that cannot be recovered through monetary
payments (e.g. murder) will challenge future generations of
policymakers. As no human would be responsible for the agent, society
will need to appropriately account for their actions through existing
penalties. They could be classified as wild animals (those without an
owner) and sentenced to death if they attack or kill a human. For lesser
crimes, they may be treated as humans and have their autonomy
restricted. In all cases, policymakers will need to disambiguate what
147
Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-ously? Free Speech Rights and
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148
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
149
See Jack M. Beard, Autonomous Weapons and Human Responsibilities,
45 GEO. J. OF INT’L L. 617 (2013); Benjamin Kastan, Autonomous Weapons
Systems: A Coming Legal Singularity, U. ILL. J.L. & TECH. POL’Y 45, 68
(2013).
150
Gless, supra note 34; Hallevy, supra note 56; Čerka, supra note 66.

2022]

THE ROLE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENE

171

classification is the most appropriate so that AI agents are subject to a
comparable and sufficient form of justice as their organic peers. This
scenario creates an uncertainty regulatory gap where policymakers
need to determine which forms of existing punishment should be
applied to non-humans. Solving this gap is important to deter the use
of AI agents as liability shields that avoid accountability over illegal
acts.151
4. Non-Human Representation
The Restatement (Third) of Agency affirms that only humans
can represent the interests of another human.152 Despite the absence of
a unifying federal regulation on this matter and the 50 potential
variations on its interpretation at the state level, a common
understanding is that an entity without personhood cannot act as a legal
agent.153 This section presents scenarios that confound this norm and
generate a regulatory gap of uncertainty where the inconsistent
application of the law attributes personhood to non-human entities that
act as agents of firms or serve as their own agent. This includes the
creation and dissolution of businesses (i.e., limited liability
corporations), where AI agents could indefinitely hold autonomous
control over a firm with corporate personhood.154
Examples in the banking sector served to materialize the
personification of non-humans.155 In two cases, non-humans served as
agents in the creation of duties that are not supposed to exist.156
151
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Considering this, Rothenberg believes that applications of AI may push
the boundaries of regulatory uncertainty to an unknown degree.157 One
where AI agents generate decisions in an infinitely large pool of
occupations that require answering questions such as: 158
•
•

Does an AI agent’s personhood reside in its software or
hardware?
Is a registration system necessary to confirm the identity of
agents?
5. Consent of Non-Humans

Marriage is a construct that formalizes relationships between
individuals through the signing of a social contract. Considering the
cornucopia of rights and responsibilities available to non-humans in the
form of corporations, the literature finds a regulatory gap of uncertainty
when organic and non-organic entities decide to marry.159 The crux of
the uncertainty is whether AI agents have an equal capacity to consent
to a decision, as do their human counterparts.
The crucial element in all legal marriages, regardless of the
jurisdiction, is that parties must consent to participate. For a human,
this means that they must have the capacity to:160
•
•
•
•

Understand the concept of marriage;
Communicate a decision;
Be free from coercion; and,
Remember decisions.

As seen above, society has deemed that marriage between
individuals must be a willing choice. The advent of scenarios where
organic and non-organic autonomous agents form a social union does
not inherently alter the notion of consent. What future public
administrators will confront is the question of whether non-humans
have the capacity to consent to a decision. In other words, can they be
attributed the same legal wherewithal as humans? Were this to happen,
157
David Marc Rothenberg, Can Siri 10.0 Buy Your Home: The Legal and
Policy Based Implications of Artificial Intelligent Robots Owning Real
Property, 11 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 439, 458 (2015).
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the government will need to consider if non-organic entities can be
classified as “individuals” whose decision to marry potentially pose no
harm to third parties.161
6. Protecting Non-Organic Entities from Harm
Ashrafian suggests that policymakers in the future may face an
uncertainty regulatory gap in classifying AI agents as humans in order
to bestow them with protections against violence or harm.162 The
scholar advocates for a future where interactions between human and
AI agents are encompassed within the scope of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. 163 This contrasts with the present state
of affairs where AI agents (e.g., robots) have little to no rights, while
their owners may exert property rights over them.164
As has been detailed in this section, future policymakers will
confront the transformation of an American democracy where nonorganic entities may claim a number of rights that are exclusively held
today by humans. Although few answers are available in this article to
guide these generations, the questions posed by researchers in this
systematic review signal the beginning of a discussion on how to mold
a society that reflects its values.
F. Privacy
Privacy is the frontier between an individual and society.165 It
embodies the rights and obligations that shield the distribution of
personally identifiable data, ideas, opinions, or correspondence from
the rest of the world. It also distinguishes private from public property
and the circumstances under which it can be trespassed by others with
the purpose of gathering information.
Context drives the perception and treatment of privacy. As
opposed to Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation, there are no

161
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comprehensive privacy rights in the U.S.166 At the Constitutional level,
the Fourth Amendment is a blueprint for the protections available to
U.S. residents from government surveillance.167 Over time, the
Supreme Court has interpreted how regulations from the 18th century
apply to our present understanding of privacy.168
At the federal level, a sectoral patchwork of regulations guides
firms on their responsibilities in handling data.169 For example, health
information is protected by the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), data gathered from minors under
the age of 13 is governed by the Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Rule (COPPA), and financial information is protected by the Fair
Credit Reporting Act.170 Similarly, state and local governments
supplement federal laws with additional safeguards or by defining key
terms differently, distinguishing how privacy depends on where a
person lives.171
AI’s impact on exacerbating existing privacy issues is split
between five regulatory gaps in the collection and analysis of
information.172 The first two gaps contain opinions by Supreme Court
Justices on the need to rethink privacy standards in the collection of
information (reasonable expectation of privacy and third-party
166
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(2016).
167
U.S. Const., amend. IV.
168
See Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1976); U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400
(2012); U.S. .v Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976).
169
Brill & Jones, supra note 166, at 1205; Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand
Words are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer Data
Profiling, 98 NW. U.L. REV. 63, 90 (2003); Kim A. Taipale, Data Mining
and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to Make Sense of Data, 5
COLUMBIA SCI. TECH.. L. REV. 1, 53 (2003).
170
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (1996),
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/PLAW-104publ191; Federal Trade
Commission, Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (“COPPA”)
(2019), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/rules/rulemaking-regulatoryreform-proceedings/childrens-online-privacy-protection-rule; Federal Trade
Commission, Fair Credit Reporting Act (2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/rules/rulemaking-regulatory-reformproceedings/fair-credit-reporting-act.
171
Stephanie Segovia, Privacy: An Issue of Priority, 11 HAST. BUS. L.J. 193,
217 (2015).
172
See generally Taipale, supra note 169.

2022]

THE ROLE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENE

175

doctrine). The third gap discusses under-inclusion in the collection and
analysis of health information by entities not covered under HIPAA.
The last two regulatory gaps examine the uncertainty in implementing
laws that protect the privacy of people from uninvited surveillance
(intrusion upon solicitude) and the obsolescence of enforcing laws that
protect consumers from manipulation (see Table 14).
Table 14 – Regulatory Gaps in Privacy
Issue
Regulatory
Type
of Government Time
Gap
Gaps
Level
Frame
Privacy
Public

in

Reasonable
Expectation
of Privacy
Third-Party
Doctrine

Sharing
Information
Entities not
Subject to Healthcare
Data
Data
Protection
Intrusion
Surveillance Upon
Solitude
Fair
Consumer
Business
Manipulation
Practices

Type of AI

Uncertainty

Federal

Present Application

Uncertainty

Federal

Present Application

Targeting
(under)

Federal
State

Uncertainty

State

+

Obsolescence Federal

Present Application

Present Application
Present Application

1. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution outlines the
standard of privacy expected in the U.S.:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.173
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The interpretation of the over 200-year-old Amendment has not
remained static. Throughout time, the Supreme Court has
contextualized it based on prevailing conditions.174 The emergence of
AI has created unprecedented surveillance capabilities in public spaces.
Efforts that would have required significant resources in the past can
now be automated at a large scale. This has raised concerns in the
Supreme Court.175 Specifically, as a federal court stated, the long-term
monitoring of an individual’s movements is likely to violate a
reasonable expectation of privacy by revealing characteristics of a
personal nature such as: “whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy
drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient
receiving medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals or
political groups.”176
Contemporary AI applications enable long-term surveillance
at a scale that validates Justice Alito’s reservations regarding what
activities should fall under the interpretation of today’s reasonable
expectation of privacy standard, thus generating a regulatory gap of
uncertainty. For instance, placing license plate readers throughout a
city makes possible the real-time detection of a population’s travel
patterns.177 Likewise, facial recognition technology (FRT), an AI
application that translates facial features into a digital fingerprint, can
recognize and track individuals in public jurisdictions (state or local),
potentially revealing information that was expected to be private.178
2. Third-Party Doctrine
The Katz v. U.S. decision spawned a second principle related
to the Fourth Amendment that faces an uncertainty regulatory gap
because of AI applications, the third-party doctrine.179 This doctrine
174
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was developed by subsequent rulings to Katz that strived to break down
thresholds for the expectations of privacy deemed reasonable by
society.180 The doctrine states that “people are not entitled to an
expectation of privacy in information they voluntarily provide to third
parties.”181 In this case, the uncertainty regulatory gap is caused by AI’s
capability to generate doubt as to the limits of this doctrine, potentially
requiring its reinterpretation by the Supreme Court.
Since the third-party doctrine was developed in the 20th
century, much has changed in terms of information availability. Access
to individuals’ data has gone from a limited number of Fourth
Amendment protected vectors (e.g. voice conversations and mail
received through the post office) to an avalanche of data exhaust.182
Today, consumers are accustomed to divulging streams of detailed
information on themselves, family, co-workers, and friends through
social networks, search engines, Internet-connected devices, and
purchases.183 Under the third-party doctrine, most of this information
is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, which means that
government agents can request access to it via an administrative order
or subpoena.184
AI performs two roles in this regulatory gap: data extraction
and analysis. In data extraction, AI-based applications serve as a
conduit to gather detailed consumer information.185 After gathering
large quantities of data from the public, this technology also facilitates
its analysis. AI can be extremely accurate in finding inferences within
databases with a virtually infinite number of variables.186 Its output can
create profiles of consumer tastes, patterns of behavior, opinions, life
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experiences, and background or link them to public records for the
benefit of advertisers and eventually government surveillance.187
Upon this background, a Justice of the Supreme Court has
expressed that existing standards for the third-party doctrine may not
address society’s needs, generating a regulatory gap of uncertainty and
making a new interpretation necessary.188 Justice Sotomayor stated that
in today’s technological environment, an expectation of privacy should
exist even when consumers give away information in the course of
everyday activities.189 Take for instance the aggregation of millions of
individually unharmful authorized privacy intrusions that, when
analyzed with the assistance of AI, reveal deep insights about a person
and create a privacy violation.190 Bearing in mind the prevalence of
such scenarios, Justice Sotomayor opined that information provided to
a third party could be reclassified to receive Fourth Amendment
protection:
It may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties . . .
But whatever the societal expectations, they can attain
constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a
prerequisite for privacy. I would not assume that all
information voluntarily disclosed to some member of
the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason
alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.191
Along with Justice Sotomayor, researchers believe that the
compilation of innocuous information can lead to insights that disclose
personal facts and push the boundaries of what society believes

187
Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt, The Impact of Emerging Information
Technologies on the Employment Relationship: New Gigs for Labor and
Employment Law, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 63, 67-68 (2017); McClurg, supra note
169, at 82-83; Tene and Polonetsky, supra note 88, at 358.
188
Segovia, supra note 171, at 208.
189
U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. at 417.
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See Miller, supra note 72, at 142-43.
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U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417-18.
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constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy.192 These concerns are
the foundation of mosaic theory, which describes how the aggregation
of individual pieces of data is collected to deduce “facts that are not
otherwise ascertainable.”193
3. Healthcare Data
The privacy of medical data is regulated by HIPAA. This
legislation defines the healthcare information that qualifies for privacy
protection (“individually identifiable health information” from devices,
clinical charts, and claims documents) and the entities obligated to
secure it (health plans, providers, among others).194 The spirit of the
policy aims to set privacy standards for medical information.
Remarkably, its exclusion of parties generates a targeting regulatory
gap of under-inclusion because it allows the collection or analysis of
sensitive data, that could be classified as medical, by entities not
subject to HIPAA.195
There are two dimensions to this regulatory gap. The first
entails the collection of identifiable medical information. Existing AI
applications make it possible for HIPAA-exempt firms to record
extensive user data that could be classified as medical.196 Firms (even
pharmaceutical companies) can legally commercialize fitness trackers
or robotic personal assistants that gather sensitive health information
such as vital signs (e.g., the Apple watch can take a person’s
electrocardiogram) or medically-relevant behavior that would

192

Steven M Bellovin et al., When Enough is Enough: Location Tracking,
Mosaic Theory, and Machine Learning, 8 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY. 556, 572
(2014).
193
Id. at 261; Joh, supra note 83, at 60.
194
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Summary of the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, 2019 (2013), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/privacy/laws-regulations/index.html; Drew Simshaw et al.,
Regulating Healthcare Robots: Maximizing Opportunities While Minimizing
Risks, 22 RICH. J.L. & TECH 1, 2 (2016); Nicolas P. Terry, Protecting Patient
Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 81 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 3, 24 (2012).
195
Donna S. Harkness, Bridging the Uncompensated Caregiver Gap: Does
Technology Provide an Ethically and Legally Viable Answer, 22 ELDER LJ
399, 429-30 (2014).
196
Id. at 420-21.
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otherwise generate confidential data if performed by covered
entities.197
A second dimension of the targeting regulatory gap is the
emergence of healthcare practice with the assistance of medical AI
applications, commonly referred to as medical algorithms or black-box
medicine. This technology relies on large quantities of data to
“discover connections between specific patient attributes and specific
symptoms, diseases, or treatments.”198 It can serve as a means to
circumvent HIPAA protection in data that is not apparently medical or
covered by regulation, but can lead to health-relevant conclusions. A
prime example is patient behavior or sentiment data, which in many
cases is only covered under a company’s privacy policy.199 Purchase
patterns can also lead to health-related inferences. The retail chain
Target used it to identify expecting mothers and tailor their marketing
towards this group.200
4. Intrusion Upon Solitude
In scenarios where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists,
each state’s civil code protects citizens from an undesired invasion
through the intrusion upon seclusion tort. It asserts that “one who
intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”201 AI applications can
generate uncertainty regarding the recourse available to citizens when
these technologies intrude on their privacy.
Scholars in the systematic review foresee a future where AIpowered applications can encroach on consumers who do not explicitly

197

Apple, Taking an ECG with the ECG App on Apple Watch Series 4
(2019), https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208955; Simshaw et al., supra
note 194, at 17; Terry, supra note 194, at 3.
198
Roger Allan Ford, W. Nicholson Price II, Privacy and Accountability in
Black-Box Medicine, 23 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2016).
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Terry, supra note 194, at 11-12.
200
Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
16, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shoppinghabits.html?_r=1&ref=charlesduhigg.
201
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652, (1977), available at
https://cyber.harvard.edu/privacy/Privacy_R2d_Torts_Sections.htm.
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agree to their terms of service or invite them into their private affairs.202
They have thought of scenarios where home robots or drones are able
to autonomously gather information, surveil the population, and share
it with other parties instantaneously.203 The uncertainty regulatory gap
concerns the reasonableness of having a person act against an apparent
violation of their privacy. On the one hand, individuals have a right to
protect themselves from irreparable harms due to the invasion of their
privacy and the distribution of information that cannot be contained.
On the other, empowering people to assert their privacy via self-help
remedies could provoke negative consequences that break other
regulations.204 It creates an incentive to damage what could be
authorized government surveillance or create a risk to the safety of
third parties if the destruction of an information-gathering AI
application generated damage to people or property.
5. Consumer Manipulation
With unknown quantities of data on the history of consumer
preferences and behavior available, AI applications detect patterns that
would be impossible to discern otherwise. The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) is the entity charged with acting against unfair
business practices.205 Section 5 of the FTC Act clarifies that a practice
needs to create substantial injury, must not be reasonably avoidable, or
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.206
The issue with applying this statute in the age of AI is that authorities
must distinguish between an independent versus a dependent decision
to identify this offense. This can be extremely difficult if a consumer is
202
Froomkin and Colangelo, supra note 118, at 31-32; Margot E. Kaminski,
Robots in the Home: What Will we Have Agreed to, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 661,
671-72 (2015).
203
Digital Media Law Project , Elements of an Intrusion Claim (2019),
http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/elements-intrusion-claim; Margot E.
Kaminski et al., Averting Robot Eyes, 76 MD. L. REV. 983, 995 (2016).
204
Froomkin and Colangelo, supra note 118, at 4-5.
205
Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74 MD. L. REV. 785,
788 (2015); Simshaw et al., supra note 194, at 30; Thierer, supra note 178,
at 106-07.
206
Brill & Jones, supra note 166, at 1210-11; Federal Trade Commission,
FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness (1980), https://www.ftc.gov/publicstatements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness; Federal Trade
Commission, Federal Trade Commission Act Section 5: Unfair or Deceptive
Acts or Practices (2016),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/ftca.pdf.
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oblivious to the control of their choices, potentially making Section 5
unenforceable and generating an obsolescence regulatory gap.
At the moment, there are several vectors in which AI
constrains autonomy in one way or another. The personalization of
search results is one of them. Firms that provide this service
purposefully censor search results based on the profile of users to
improve their relevance.207 In the long-term, this may lead to an
“autonomy trap.”208 Similar to search engines, social media interfaces
can target users according to their disposition. Recent findings evince
the use of data to target populations for the purpose of manipulating
their intention to vote during elections.209 The proliferation of AI-based
home robots can become another vector for manipulation. They
differentiate themselves from search engines in that, in addition to
compiling data on users, they are able to form social relationships that
can be used to mislead individuals (including vulnerable populations
such as children or the elderly).210
G. Safety and Certification
This section describes scenarios where the government
assumes the role of an intermediary to protect individuals from physical
and non-physical harm (see Table 15). Protection from physical harm
entails preserving the safety or bodily integrity of a person. The
systematic review identified cases where a method or application of AI
can cause such harms in medicine and transportation. Non-physical
harms are suffered when a person’s interests are negatively affected.
Catalogued under certification, it depicts professions where the
imposition of barriers to entry guarantees a minimum level of
competence to serve a target population.
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Table 15 - Regulatory Gaps in Safety and Certification
Issue
Regulatory
Type
of Government
Gap
Gaps
Level
FDA Approval
of Black-Box Novelty
Federal
Medicine
Medical
Federal
+
Uncertainty
Services
State
Discrimination
of
Foreign Obsolescence Federal
Vessels
Differentiation
between
Targeting
State
Vehicle
(over)
Capabilities
Driver
Targeting
State
Licensing
(over)
California
Safety
Insurance
Obsolescence State
Standards
Seldomly
Enforced
Obsolescence State
Rules
Subjective
Driving
Obsolescence State
Standards
FMVSS
Novelty
Federal
Guidelines
Human
and
Semi-AV
Novelty
State
Interaction
Baseline
Federal
+
Safety
Uncertainty
State
Standards
Financial
Targeting
Federal
Services
(under)
Certification Legal Services Uncertainty
State
Public Office
Uncertainty
Federal

Time
Frame
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Type of AI

Present Application
Future

Application

Future

Application

Future

Application

Future

Application

Future

Application

Future

Application

Future

Application

Present Application
Present Application
Present Application
Present Application
Present Application
Future Application
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1. Safety
Humans have a natural tendency to avoid circumstances where
they are threatened by danger. To complement these efforts, the
government utilizes policy levers to mitigate against threats to the
safety of their constituents. This section examines regulatory gaps
related to protecting individuals from harms caused by AI in healthcare
and transportation.
a. FDA Approval of Black-Box Medicine
In healthcare, the usage of AI in medicine, known as medical
algorithms or black-box medicine, is catalogued as a medical device
that falls under the aegis of the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA).211 Medical algorithms or black-box medicine refer to products
that discover complex relationships between a patient’s characteristics
and potential diagnoses or treatments through “opaque computational
models.”212 The word opaque indicates the use of AI methods (i.e.,
machine learning) where it may not be possible (even by the developer)
to detail the mechanism by which conclusions are reached or causality
is currently extremely difficult or impossible to confirm.213
Although clear standards exist to establish the risk profile and
testing for most medical products, this type of application causes two
gaps. The first is novelty because it does not fit the paradigms of testing
that validate existing products undergoing FDA clearance. For one,
clinical trials may not be possible because they require assembling a
cohort of similar people that are randomized into treatment and control
groups to observe differences in outcomes. Black-box medicine does
not work this way. Instead of grouping people, this technology can
tailor its solutions to the characteristics of individuals. This precludes
the recruitment of a clinical trial to predict the “individual responses of
individual patients.”214
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W Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419,
424 (2015) (hereinafter Price I); Medical algorithms or black-box medicine
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computational models” W Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box
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Another barrier is the fluid nature of black-box medicine. As
researchers feed data to the machine learning algorithm, it can
constantly train and improve itself. Realistically, the algorithm and its
outputs can change on a daily basis. The dynamic nature of this
technology contrasts with the FDA’s product testing protocols. 215 The
system in place for high-risk medical devices was not created to
evaluate rapidly evolving machines or algorithms and may restrict
consumer access to life-saving technologies.
b. Medical Services
Once the previous novelty gap is resolved, the evolution and
penetration of this technology may generate a second regulatory gap –
one where there is uncertainty regarding what government level
regulates the practice of medicine.
Today, there are two players in this scenario. The FDA has authority
over the commercialization of medical devices (this covers black-box
medicine), while each state governs how medicine is practiced by
health care professionals.216 In the status quo, humans are wholly
charged with caring for patients. If the influence of black-box medicine
spreads to the point of becoming the main source of the comprehensive
diagnosis and treatment of patients, the human practice of medicine
could be overshadowed by the output of medical devices.217
Although the FDA has no authority in dictating the practice of
medicine, scholars speculate that the increasing reliance on this
technology can make it the de facto agency charged with these
standards.218 The idea is that a transition from a human-centered
healthcare system to one dominated by black-box medicine may create
a scenario where the FDA and state agencies clash over which one has
the power to determine how medicine is practiced.
c. Discrimination of Foreign Vessels
215

Id.
Robert Kocher, Doctors Without State Borders: Practicing Across State
Lines (2014),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20140218.036973/full/;
Medical Board of California, Guide to the Laws Governing the Practice of
Medicine by Physicians and Surgeons (2013),
http://www.mbc.ca.gov/About_Us/Laws/laws_guide.pdf.
217
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Outside of healthcare, the commercial release of land and seafaring vehicles that dispense of humans, via the automation of
navigation, have overarching policy implications that produce safety
regulatory gaps. In the maritime industry, internationally registered
autonomous vessels confront the regulatory gap of obsolescence in
regulations that create unnecessary distinctions between equally safe
domestic and foreign vessels.
Nautical regulations in the U.S. differentiate between the
minimum number of crew needed to safely operate domestic and
foreign registered vessels.219 While domestic autonomous ships can
theoretically travel in U.S. waters without any crew, this privilege is
not extended to their international counterparts. 220 When this
technology becomes available, policies that treat similarly equipped
autonomous vessel differently because of their country of registration
will confront the regulatory gap of obsolescence.
d. Differentiation
Capabilities

between

Vehicle

In today’s marketplace, firms are investing in the development
of cars with varying levels of automation. 221 Vehicles catalogued as
semi-AV require driver supervision (e.g., Tesla’s autopilot), while
completely AVs discount the need for a driver, making the on or offboard computer responsible for directing its navigation, acceleration,
and braking.222
All regulations related to vehicles on U.S. roads are subject to
a shared jurisdiction between federal and state agencies.223 Through the
219

See 46 CFR, § 15.715 (2020).
Michal Chwedczuk, Analysis of the Legal Status of Unmanned
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y.pdf; SAE INTERNATIONAL, Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the federal
government implements guidelines for vehicle safety equipment and
its testing. For instance, the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
(FMVSS) dictate the characteristics of breaks activated by a person’s
foot, manual turn signals, visual alerts, and the position of the rearview
mirror, among others.224 In turn, state motor vehicle agencies are
responsible for “licensing, registration, traffic law enforcement, safety
inspections, infrastructure, insurance, and liability regulations.”225
AVs represent a transition from human-centric to AI agentbased navigation. Emancipating humans from the control of their
vehicles produces regulatory gaps that affect state and federal
jurisdictions. On land, AVs are widely discussed by scholars in the
systematic literature review. Eight regulatory gaps related to safety are
examined in areas as diverse as driver licensing, California’s insurance
standards, and the lack of differentiation between vehicle capabilities
by state governments.
A targeting regulatory gap of over-inclusion emerges when
vehicles are treated equally despite their capabilities. In principle, nonautonomous, semi-autonomous, and completely AVs require different
levels of driver/passenger attention. Yet, state laws do not differentiate
them when regulating driving behavior.226 New York and
Massachusetts require drivers to have at least one hand on the steering
wheel of a moving vehicle.227 Vehicles with higher levels of autonomy,
especially completely AVs, are over-included in these regulations
because the amount of attention drivers/passengers devote to road
conditions may not improve their safety.228

224
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e. Driver Licensing
Overinclusion is similarly evinced in the allocation of driver
licenses.229 Today’s status quo is that drivers in most states are required
to pass the same examination regardless of their vehicle.230 In reality,
non-AV drivers are expected to command comparatively more skills
than their completely AV counterparts. Forcing equal testing standards
for a license limits the participation of individuals with disabilities or
those unable to control a vehicle from maximizing the benefits of this
technology.231
f.

California Insurance Standards

California’s insurance standards are meant to promote safe
driving behavior, yet completely AVs could make them an example of
an obsolescence regulatory gap. In 1988 voters passed Proposition 103,
which mandated the implementation of practices by vehicle insurance
companies operating in the state such as calculating quotes based on
factors including driving safety record and years of experience.232 If
completely AVs replace non-autonomous vehicles as the dominant
form of transportation, this policy could become obsolete because the
driving experience would no longer be a proxy for a safe driving
record.233 The proposition also obligates firms to offer a twenty percent
good driver discount to qualifying clients with a record of safe
driving.234 If AVs significantly improve the safety of road conditions,
owning these vehicles would likely qualify any individual for this
discount. As AVs make up a larger share of the car park, the provision
of this safety “subsidy” may challenge the financial sustainability of
insurance companies.
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g. Seldomly Enforced Rules
Obsolescence also appears in state driving policies that are no
longer enforced by authorities. Brodsky highlights a New Jersey law
that requires drivers to honk whenever they pass any vehicle (including
cyclists and skateboarders).235 Drivers do not follow these rules and
traffic officers seldomly fine individuals for violating them.
Nevertheless, completely autonomous vehicles would codify these
road regulations and, in the case of New Jersey, will at the very least
irritate other drivers and, at most, cause a deadly crash.
h. Subjective Driving Standards
Similarly, road regulations intended for subjective human
interpretation could generate a regulatory gap of obsolescence if and
when they are applied to completely AVs.236 These laws appear to be
promulgated for the express purpose of providing individuals with
discretion over changing road conditions. For instance, North Carolina
has a traffic law stating that “[n]o person shall drive a vehicle on a
highway or in a public vehicular area at a speed greater than is
reasonable and prudent under the conditions then existing.”237
Subjective regulations face challenges that could lead to obsolescence,
such as their translation into the rules that manage the “behavior” of
completely AVs.
i.

FMVSS Guidelines

A novelty regulatory gap is encountered at the federal level.
The FMVSS standards designate the equipment required for the safe
operation of vehicles in the U.S. (e.g., manual switches, pedals, and
controls).238 Depending on the design, some AVs remove key elements
of currently mandatory equipment from the FMVSS, such as the
steering wheel and pedals for braking or accelerating.239 Because of
235
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237
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238
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239
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this, AI applications face a regulatory gap of novelty where new rules
are needed to include completely AVs within the FMVSS’ safety
baseline. For these standards to remain pertinent to the safety of
vehicles, federal regulations need to codify the inclusion of completely
autonomous characteristics. Even though the federal government has
issued industry guidance and measures to exempt automakers from
existing guidelines, the regulatory landscape has yet to reach a
resolution.240
j.

Human and Semi-AV Interaction

In terms of human and semi-AV interaction, state governments
are charged with regulating driver behavior, which includes laws
stipulating that drivers must continuously pay attention to road
conditions.241 Drivers of semi-AVs, those that require driver
supervision, confront a novelty regulatory gap. Concretely, these
vehicles lack safety guidelines that specifically tackle the transition
between human and vehicle control of navigation. Today, drivers are
responsible for supervising their vehicles until a complex maneuver
forces them to take over control. However, a successful transition
between a human and their vehicle is crucial for road safety. As of
today, no standards exist on the optimal visual, auditory, or tactile alerts
to communicate that the attention of a driver is needed.242
k. Baseline Safety Standards
Lastly, the regulatory gap of uncertainty is found when
determining what entity should create baseline standards for an AV
safety algorithm.243 Authorities could outsource decision-making to the
private sector, where manufacturers or industry groups would create

240
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their own standards for driver decision-making.244 Alternatively, states
could assume control of a vehicle’s safety algorithm by arguing that
their jurisdiction oversees driving behavior; although in this case,
humans are replaced by computers.245 Federal authorities may overrule
states by asserting that these standards are an element of a vehicle’s
equipment and covered in the FMVSS. In all cases, guidelines will
need to be formulated so that decision-making software performs on
the road in a manner that maximize safety as well as, or better than,
human drivers.246
2. Certification
Society has determined that certain professions impose barriers
of entry (e.g., licenses, degrees, exams, or elections) to restrict
individuals from entering these sectors and protect consumers from
non-physical harms, those suffered when a person’s interests are
negatively affected. Three regulatory gaps related to certification were
identified in the systematic review.
a. Financial Services
Professionals in the financial services sector are bound by
regulations that verify their competence through a licensing process
that entails training on fraud, standards of conduct, and passing
background checks.247 Financial applications of AI that emulate the
work of humans in this field skirt regulations meant to control
participation in this profession. Therefore, they are under-included in
the policies that license or certify humans to safeguard the market from
unwanted behavior.248
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b. Legal Services
In the legal services arena, the dearth of providers targeted at
medium and low-income customers opened a market for AI
applications that provide tailored advice. Although these applications
have expanded access to justice, uncertainty exists as to their legality
(formally referred to as the unauthorized practice of law).
At the heart of this debate is the extent to which AI is used
and by whom. The American Bar Association (ABA) is the nongovernmental body that regulates the practice of law at the state level.
Similar to financial service professionals, they may argue that legal
services are credence goods where clients can find it difficult to
assess the quality or value of what they receive.249 The opinion of the
ABA is that law firms can outsource work to non-lawyers who use AI
as long as fees are not shared, and they do not perform the duties of a
lawyer.250 But what are the duties of a lawyer? A clear definition does
not exist, but proxies for it do.251 Courts throughout the nation have
attempted to distinguish between the work of a lawyer and a
layperson. Many have focused on evaluating the difference between a
service that completes a legal form using the information given by a
customer from one that assists in analyzing which form is the most
appropriate and how to properly complete it.252 Some have concluded
that the latter constitutes the unlawful provision of legal services.253
Lauritsen argues that AI-based software is protected as a form
of expression under the First Amendment.254 If true, the ABA may
have an opinion as to what constitutes a legal service, but it cannot
limit the protection of a First Amendment right to legal information in
the form of software offered to the public. Determining the difference
between what constitutes a source of knowledge with a service that
249

Tanina Rostain, Robots Versus Lawyers: A User-Centered Approach, 30
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 559, 572 (2017).
250
John O. McGinnis & Russell G Pearce, The Great Disruption: How
Machine Intelligence Will transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of
Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3060 (2013).
251
Dru Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, Bargaining in the Shadow of Big
Data, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1337, 1389 (2015).
252
See Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots Be Lawyers: Computers,
Lawyers, and the Practice of Law, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501, 547
(2017); See e.g., Willick, supra note 52, at 1-2.
253
See Marc Lauritsen, Liberty, Justice, and Legal Automata, 88 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 945, 949-50 (2012).
254
See id. at 957-59.
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functions as a lawyer is at the crux of this debate. In other words, a
grey area exists in determining if software that dispenses legal advice
equates to the illegal provision of legal services.
c. Public Office
Lastly, AI has been incorporated into government to
complement decision-making, increase the nimbleness of action, and
keep up with the analytic capabilities of the private sector.255 One
speculative scenario that creates uncertainty relates to the delegation of
duties to non-humans by Congress. Under the Constitution, legislative
powers are vested in members of Congress who have the capacity to
delegate them as long as they are restricted in scope, also known as the
intelligible principle test.256 Thus far, this prerogative has only been
vested in humans. In the future, AI entities could be given the power to
either make administrative decisions or to execute actions on behalf of
the government. In the short term, scholars do not believe that the
delegation of administrative duties to non-humans could lead to an
improper transfer of power.257 In the long run, it has yet to be
determined what level of power a congressionally-mandated AI
application could assume and what repercussion this delegation of
authority would have on constituents.
H. Use of Force
The incorporation of autonomous weapon systems (AWS),
technology that is able to complement or substitute human decisionmaking in battlefield scenarios, into military inventories has the power
to alter the calculus of war.258 These applications of AI are able to
reduce an army’s exposure to chemical or biological weapons,
eliminate the concern for a soldier’s self-preservation instinct, and
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See e.g., Thomas J. Barth & Eddy Arnold, Artificial Intelligence and
Administrative Discretion: Implications for Public Administration, 29 AM.
REV. PUBLIC ADM. 332, 347 (1999).
256
See National Conference of State Legislatures, SEPARATION OF
POWERS—DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER (2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/delegation-oflegislative-power.aspx.
257
Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 71, at 1177-84.
258
See Heather M. Roff, Lethal Autonomous Weapons and Jus Ad Bellum
Proportionality, 47 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 47, 50 (2015).
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replace human judgement in the selection and engagement of targets.259
The U.S. is a leading developer of weapons and the first government to
adopt an AWS definition.260 Because of these reasons, 2010-2020
represent a decade where debate on the future of AWS has come to the
fore.261
The use of force section examines seven regulatory gaps
related to AWS (see Table 16). The first six relate to nation-to-nation
combat. The last regulatory gap moves away from multinational
conflict and delves into domestic policy through the Second
Amendment. Its application to AWS generates the regulatory gap of
uncertainty because of the conflicting views of how the judicial and
executive branches will interpret the right to carry and use them.

259

See generally John O. McGinnis, Accelerating AI, 104 NW. U.L. REV.
366, 368 (2010); Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Out of the
Loop: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 231, 262-65 (2012); see also Jeroen van den Boogaard,
Proportionality and Autonomous Weapons Systems, 6 J. INT. HUMANIT. LEG.
STUD. 1, 22 (2015).
260
See New US policy, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS (Apr. 16, 2013),
https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2013/04/new-us-policy
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See Mia Gandenberger, CCW Adopts Mandate to Discuss Killer Robots,
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Table 16 - Regulatory Gaps in Use of Force
Issue

Regulatory
Gap

Type
Gaps

of Government Time
Level
Frame

Defining
AWS

Confirming
their Existence

Uncertainty Federal

Present Application

Meaningful
Human
Control

Interaction
Between
Uncertainty Federal
Human
and
AWS

Present Application

Accountability

Foreseeability
of Illegal Acts

Federal

Present Application

Federal

Present Application

Federal

Present Application

Federal

Present Application

Novelty

Targeting
(Under)
Legality
of
Targeting
Proportionality
AWS
(Under)
Targeting
Humanity
(Under)
Second
Domestic Use
Amendment
Uncertainty
of Force
and AWS
Distinction

Federal
+
Future
State + Local

Type of AI

Application

1. Existence of AWS
The analysis begins with the uncertainty of whether AWS
exist. Governments and non-governmental organizations throughout
the world have conflicting views on what constitutes AWS. On one end
of the spectrum, these weapons have yet to be created because humans
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still control them,262 are defensive in nature,263 the bar has been set too
high to qualify as such, 264 or the cyberweapon variant of these systems
is excluded because they don’t catalyze kinetic damage, among other
reasons. 265 On the other end, militaries have manufactured,
262

See DEP'T OF DEF.,, DIRECTIVE 3000.09, 2 (2012),
https://www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodd/300009p.
pdf; see also Christof Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/23/47
(Apr. 9, 2013),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Se
ssion23/A-HRC-23-47_en.pdf; U.S- Mission Geneva, U.S. Supports
Continued Substantive Discussion of Laws in the CCW, U.S. MISSION TO
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GENEVA (Apr. 11, 2016),
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmamentfora/ccw/2016/meeting-experts-laws/statements/12April_USA.pdf; Ian
McKay, The Concention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Informal
Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, OPENING
STATEMENT (2018),
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmamentfora/ccw/2018/gge/statements/9April_US.pdf; Michael W. Meier, The
Concention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Informal Meeting of
Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, U.S. DELEGATION
OPENING STATEMENT (2016),
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmamentfora/ccw/2016/meeting-experts-laws/statements/11April_UnitedStates.pdf;
Bonnie Docherty, Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots (2012),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload_0_0.pdf.
263
See U.S. Mission Geneva, supra note 262, at 2; Kelly Cass, Autonomous
Weapons and Accountability: Seeking Solutions in the Law of War, 48 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1017, 1037 (2014); Heyns, supra note 262, at 8; Frank Sauer,
Stopping’Killer Robots’: Why Now Is the Time to Ban Autonomous Weapons
Systems, 46 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 8 (2016).
264
See Thompson Chengeta, Defining the Emerging Notion of Meaningful
Human Control in Weapon Systems, 49 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 833, 833
(2016); MINISTRY OF DEF., THE UK APPROACH TO UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS, 2-3 (2011),
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/3890-uk-ministry-of-defense-jointdoctrine-note-211-the; Gregory P. Noone & Diana C, Noone, The Debate
Over Autonomous Weapons Systems, 47 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 25, 27-28
(2015); Christopher M. Ford, Autonomous Weapons and International Law.
69 S. CAR. L. REV. INT'L L. 413, 429 (2017).
265
See generally Kenneth Anderson, Why the Hurry to Regulate Autonomous
Weapon Systems-But Not Cyber-Weapons, 30 TEMP. INT’L COMP. L.J. 17, 28
(2016); Christopher M. Kovach, Beyond Skynet: Reconciling Increased
Autonomy in Computer-Based Weapons Systems with the Laws of War, 71
AFL REV. 231, 271 (2014); DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 262 (“Does not apply
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inventoried, and utilized AWS for over 30 years via systems that are
denominated as autonomous because the bar has been set too low,266
individuals and institutions have tacitly recognized their existence,267
or researchers focus on criticizing the deficit of AWS recognition by
institutions.268 The lack of a shared understanding of this technology’s
characteristics hampers its governance and fuels a regulatory gap of
uncertainty.
2. Meaningful Human Control
The next gap examines the conflicting standards sought by
governments at the multilateral level to keep humans in control of
AWS decision-making. To date, the positions of stakeholders under the
banner of meaningful human control and its variants are subject to
disagreement and prone to inconsistent application, leading to the
regulatory gap of uncertainty.
Under the umbrella of meaningful human control, a continuum
of benchmarks is proposed by researchers and advocates.269 In all of
to autonomous or semi-autonomous cyberspace systems for cyberspace
operations; unarmed, unmanned platforms; unguided munitions; munitions
manually guided by the operator (e.g., laser- or wire-guided munitions);
mines; or unexploded explosive ordnance.”); Hollis, supra note 145, at 7-8.
266
See Mark Gubrud, Stopping Killer Robots, 70 BULL. AT. SCI. 32, 33-24
(2014); Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy
Implications, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1851-52 (2014).
267
See e.g., Merel A. C. Ekelhof, Complications of a Common Language:
Why it is so Hard to Talk About Autonomous Weapons, 22 J. CONFL. SECUR.
LAW 311, 311-14 (2017); ICRC, AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS,
IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASING AUTONOMY IN THE CRITICAL
FUNCTIONS OF WEAPONS 8 (2016), https://shop.icrc.org/autonomousweapon-systems.html?___store=default; ICRC, Views of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on Autonomous Weapon System 1, 2
(2016), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/views-icrc-autonomous-weaponsystem; Chris Jenks, False Rubicons, Moral Panic, & Conceptual Cul-DeSacs: Critiquing & Reframing the Call to Ban Lethal Autonomous Weapons,
44 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 33 (2016).
268
See Docherty, supra note 262; see also Jenks, supra note 267, at 51.
269
See Richard Moyes, Key Elements of Meaningful Human Control 3-4
(Article 36, Background Paper, 2016), http://www.article36.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/MHC-2016-FINAL.pdf; Michael C. Horowitz &
Paul Scharre, Meaningful Human Control in Weapon Systems: A Primer
(Center for a New American Security, 2015),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/Ethical_Autonomy_Wor
king_Paper_031315.pdf?mtime=20160906082316; Frank Sauer, ICRAC
Statement on Technical Issues to the 2014 UN CCW Expert Meeting, ICRAC
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them, parties can interpret the human role in the decision-making
process of an AWS differently.270 One could require that all actions are
human-approved. Another may focus on human supervisors with veto
power over decisions. A third could trust the restrictions placed by a
programmer as sufficient to control an AI agent. As is apparent, no
consensus exists on how to implement meaningful human control.
The U.S. has stated that meaningful human control is a
subjective term that lacks clear meaning.271 Instead, all autonomous
and semi-autonomous systems within its inventory should follow an
“appropriate levels of human judgment” standard.272 By advocating
this position, the U.S. military believes that AWS can perform its duties
without the need for human supervision.273 However, applying
appropriate levels of human judgment is not straightforward. The
absence of a definition for “appropriate” generates uncertainty as to
how the military will use AWS.274 For any given engagement, it is
unclear what level of human attention and/or inputs are required prior,
during, and subsequent to an attack.275
3. Foreseeability of Illegal Acts
The foreseeability of illegal acts issue deals with the indirect
accountability of commanders and manufacturers for AWS.276 The
regulatory gap of novelty found in the literature is caused by the
(2014), https://www.icrac.net/icrac-statement-on-technical-issues-to-the2014-un-ccw-expert-meeting/; Paul Scharre, Centaur Warfighting: The
False Choice of Humans vs. Automation, 30 TEMP. INT’L COMP. LJ 151, 160
(2016).
270
Rebecca Crootof, A Meaningful Floor for Meaningful Human Control, 30
TEMP. INT’L COMP. L.J. 53, 54 (2016).
271
See Ford, supra note 264, at 452; U.S. Mission Geneva, U.S. Supports
Continued Substantive Discussion of Laws in the CCW, U.S. MISSION TO
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GENEVA (Apr. 11, 2016),
https://geneva.usmission.gov/2016/04/11/laws/.
272
DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 262 at 2; Ryan Jenkins, Averting the Moral
Free-for-All of Autonomous Weapons, 41 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 119,
122 (2017); Dan Saxon, A Human Touch: Autonomous Weapons, Directive
3000.09, and the "Appropriate Levels of Human Judgment over the Use of
Force", 15 GEORG. J. INT. AFF. 100, 101 (2014).
273
See Gubrud, supra note 266, at 36.
274
See id. at 37.
275
See Saxon, supra note 272, at 107.
276
Eric Talbot Jensen, The Future of the Law of Armed Conflict: Ostriches,
Butterflies, and Nanobots, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 253, 289 (2014); see Beard,
supra note 149; Saxon, supra note 272, at 101.
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absence of standards to determine the responsibility for the potentially
unpredictable decision-making of this technology.277 Policymakers
need to address this problem to avoid having AWS be used as a
scapegoat in the commitment of atrocities.278
Regulatory gaps are not found when a party intentionally
commits an illegal act using this technology. Prosecuting this crime
would be no different from any other crime. A regulatory gap of
novelty is found in the absence of standards to determine the indirect
responsibility for using an AWS.279 In other words, to what extent
should parties be accountable for the unforeseeable behavior of these
weapon systems?
For indirect responsibility to apply to either party (commanders or
manufacturers), an entity should have reasonably known the outcome
of AWS behavior. In battlefields where this technology is present, the
standards for what constitutes a reasonable warning of a machine’s
future behavior have yet to be created. This void generates a novelty
regulatory gap where policymakers should create a standard
considering the following questions:280
•
•
•

If there is knowledge of illegal actions taken by one AWS,
would this be sufficient notice for that unit, or would that also
apply to all units with similar software?
“Would fully autonomous weapons be predictable enough to
provide commanders with the requisite notice of potential
risk?”
“Would liability depend on a particular commander's
individual understanding of the complexities of programming
and autonomy?”
4. Legality of AWS

The next three regulatory gaps concern the legality of AWS
decision-making. The rules and conditions for conducting warfare are
encapsulated under the umbrella of the Law of Armed Conflict
277
Thompson Chengeta, Accountability Gap: Autonomous Weapon Systems
and Modes of Responsibility in International Law, 45 DENV. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 1, 2-3 (2016); Ford, supra note 264, at 461; Jenkins, supra note 272.
278
See Gubrud, supra note 266, at 36.
279
See Chengeta, supra note 277, at 2; see also Ford, supra note 264, at 460;
Jenkins, supra note 272.
280
Rebecca Crootof, War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous Weapons,
164 U. PA. L. REV. 1347, 1381 (2016).
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(LOAC) (also referred to as the Law of War or International
Humanitarian Law). 281 They were conceived in an era where only
humans decided whether to target and kill people. The advent of AWS
allows non-humans to make these choices and, because of this, the
LOAC suffers from a regulatory gap of targeting (under-inclusion) in
three of its principles: distinction,282
proportionality,283 and
humanity.284
5. Domestic Use of Force
The use of force literature is dominated by research on AWS
and their effect on the future of nation-to-nation combat. Less popular
of a topic are the legal questions surrounding its domestic ownership.
Although the right to bear arms is a settled constitutional question, the
extent to which AWS are considered a weapon is untested in the justice
system. The regulatory gap addressed in this section is the uncertainty
of how AWS will fit domestic regulations on the possession and use of
arms.
For AWS to become legal, the justice system will likely tackle
two problems. The first is the issue of common use denomination. In
the case of the District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court
defined weapons as those that are in common use for a lawful purpose,
281

Id. at 1399.
See Kovach, supra note 265, at 239; David T. Laton, Manhattan_Project.
exe: A Nuclear Option for the Digital Age, 25 CATH. UNIV. J.L. & TECH 94,
151 (2017); Schmitt and Thurnher, supra note 259, at 251; Ford, supra note
264, at 434; Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law,
NTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 12 (2009),
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf; Michael J.
Boyle, The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare, 89 INT. AFF. 1, 12
(2013), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1984-costs-and-consequencesof-drone-warfare; Gregory S. McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability,
102 GEO. L. J. 681, 707 (2014); Cass, supra note 263, at 1020; Kastan, supra
note 149, at 55.
283
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18 YALE J.L. &TECH. 1, 3 (2017); Gevers, supra note 145.
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See Crootof, supra note 266, at 1366; Gubrud, supra note 266, at 34;
Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict,
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (Apr. 30, 1997),
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/other/57jnhy.htm;
Kastan, supra note 149, at 56; Gevers, supra note 145.
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as is the case of firearms.285 As of today, no AWS are available to the
public; thus, they do not fit the definition set by the Supreme Court and
are not legal.286 In fact, Congress at the state and federal level could
ban these weapons to prevent them from ever becoming popular.287 If
they decide not to act, the judicial system would have to clarify several
aspects of common use: What is the minimum quantity of AWS that
qualifies as common use? Which categories of AWS are eligible (e.g.,
lethal, non-lethal, stationary, non-stationary, etc.)?
The second issue references the word bear, where the justice
system has deliberated on the relationship between a weapon’s
wearability and its lawfulness288 Definitions from the time the
Amendment was written interpreted the meaning of the word as the
capacity to be carried. As a result, the Supreme Court established in the
case of the District of Columbia v. Heller that, as long as a weapon can
be carried, it is legal.289 This does not mean that AWS that cannot be
carried are illegal. Scholars discuss the auxiliary rights inherent in the
ownership of weapons and future litigation could contend that the
usage of a robot bodyguard is an auxiliary right that increases the
effectiveness of a firearm when a user is unskilled for the purposes of
self-defense.290
IV.

OVERVIEW OF RESULTS

Section three answers this article’s first research question by
identifying regulatory gaps caused by AI methods and applications in
the U.S. It does so via a systematic review designed to screen a sample
of articles in the academic literature and uncover where AI pushes the
boundaries of public policy. This section contextualizes these gaps by
answering the second research question: when looking across all of the
gaps identified in the first research question, what trends and insights
emerge that can help stakeholders plan for the future?
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The overarching trends presented below come from the analysis of
labels that describe the regulatory gaps in this article: policy theme,
type of regulatory gap, level of government, temporality, and type of
AI. Readers of this section should keep in mind that these findings are
informed by a sample of the literature and are not intended to be a
definitive account of AI’s policy repercussions.
Considering these limitations, there are several interesting
findings. First, this article validated the combination of BennetMoses’s and Calo’s ideas as an effective means to characterize
regulatory gaps caused by AI. Second, the scarcity of novelty
regulatory gaps in the systematic review indicates that existing policies
are largely adequate to withstand the issues generated by this
technology. Third, there is an even split between existing regulatory
gaps and those expected in the future. This is interpreted as a sign that
the U.S. is in the middle of a transition where applications and methods
of AI are permeating society, and policymakers should expect more
regulatory gaps. Fourth, local government decision-makers have
limited exposure to gaps compared to their state and federal
counterparts. Lastly, applications of AI, particularly AVs, caused the
majority of gaps found in this article.
A. Validation and Adaptation of Key Ideas
The systematic review confirmed that an adapted version of
Bennett-Moses’s and Calo’s ideas is effective in contextualizing the
phenomenon of regulatory gaps. Bennett-Moses’s framework
characterizes “legal problems…[that]… arise from technological
change.”291 Applying the framework to one technology (AI) in 50 cases
of regulatory gaps corroborated its ability to withstand scrutiny. No
cases were found in which the uncertainty, novelty, targeting, or
obsolescence categories were not applicable.
Calo’s taxonomy was conceived as a guide to understand the
“contemporary policy environment around artificial intelligence” for
“policymakers, investors, scholars, and students.”292 This work was not
created to classify AI-based regulatory gaps. To adapt it, this article
implemented a systematic review to develop an empirically updated
version of the taxonomy that clustered regulatory gaps around themes
(see Table 17). This resulted in the deletion and creation of themes and
291

Lyria Bennett-Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep up
With Technological Change, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. POL’Y 239, 242 (2007).
292
Calo, supra note 2 at 403.
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sub-themes tailored to this article’s perspective of the AI and policy
relationship.
Table 17 - Adaptation of Calo's Taxonomy
Original Version
Adapted Version
Justice and Equity
Accountability
Privacy and Power
Classification of Individuals
Safety and Certification
Displacement of labor
Taxation and Displacement of Labor Justice System
Use of Force
Personhood
Privacy
Safety and Certification
Use of Force
An important change to Calo’s taxonomy was the elimination
of the taxation and power themes (see Table 17). Originally, the
taxation literature featured important problems stemming from the
decline in income tax revenue caused by the loss of employment
opportunities.293 This theme was dropped because no regulatory gaps
linked to it were found. The power theme denotes the creation of
monopolies due to the management of consumer data. Similarly,
insufficient evidence was found that AI methods and applications
contributed to the generation of regulatory gaps in this issue.
The justice and equity theme initially covered a broad
spectrum of issues within “fairness, accountability, and transparency.”
294
To improve its targeting, three themes were created. Accountability
examines the question of what entity is responsible for remedying
pecuniary and non-pecuniary harms caused by AI agents.295 The
classification of individuals theme focuses on how governments and
the private sector use labels to make important decisions about people.
The justice system theme concentrates on the impact of AI in the
operation of courtrooms.
One of this article’s contributions is the creation of a theme not
originally covered in Calo’s work: personhood. It contains the
regulatory gaps caused by the provision of rights and responsibilities
associated with humans or juridical persons to AI agents. As the
capabilities of this technology’s methods and applications improve, the
legal distinctions between a human and a sufficiently autonomous non293
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295
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human can become progressively more difficult to make. This theme
examines the frontier of this debate, where the regulatory gaps
generated challenge our perception of personhood.
B. Type of Gaps
Bennett-Moses’s framework describes the role of technology
in generating instances where public policies are not adequate to
confront the issues faced by society, known as regulatory gaps.296 This
systematic review searched for gaps catalyzed by applications or
methods of AI in the U.S. The distribution of gaps in Table 18 is a
window into the nature of policy challenges found in the screened-in
literature. At first glance, it shows that targeting (over-inclusion) was
the least prevalent gap (6%) and uncertainty was the most prevalent
(42%). Upon closer examination, the more interesting story for
stakeholders is the proportion of novelty gaps found in this sample.
Table 18 – Distribution of Regulatory Gaps in the Systematic
Review by Prevalence
# of Regulatory
Type of Gap Definition
Gaps
With respect to a policy goal,
technology
causes
Targeting
circumstances in which its
3
(over)
application is not directed to the
goal, but fall within its scope
(over-inclusiveness).
Technology creates behavior
Novelty
that
requires
bespoke 6
government action.
A technology makes a regulation
Obsolescence irrelevant or unenforceable.
10
Targeting
(under)

Uncertainty

296

With respect to a policy goal,
there are circumstances falling
outside its scope where its 10
application would further the
goal (under-inclusiveness).
Conflict arises because a new
technology is not easily 21
classified.

See Bennett-Moses, supra note 1.
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A novelty gap is one where a technology instigates behaviors
that are unique to the point that policymakers had not thought of
addressing them or there are new reasons to act on situations requiring
bespoke attention.297 This article found that only 12% of gaps are
classified as novelty, which implies that few scenarios entail the
creation of regulation. At least in the short term, it does not appear
necessary for policymakers to implement new approaches for the
administration of government or create government agencies
specialized in this technology.
The majority of regulatory gaps (88%) caused by applications
or methods of AI occur for reasons unrelated to novelty. In other words,
adaptions rather than new laws are required to solve most gaps. My
interpretation of this finding is that the status quo of U.S. policymaking
is largely adequate to withstand the issues generated by AI. Although
policymakers and the public can undoubtedly expect to be tested by
this technology, the resolution to these problems is not new regulation.
A good example is uncertainty gaps. These denote instances where a
technology leads to differences in opinion about its classification
between jurisdictions or levels of government. Once an authority
clarifies the interpretation of the gap, it should no longer exist.
Future research should address the optimal solutions for the
gaps within this work. This article purposefully avoided offering
alternatives for bridging or resolving these issues because doing so is a
political process reliant on the ideology or theory of governance of a
public administration. Any action taken by governments to address
challenges should consider the relevant context and define their
preferred modality of action.
In general, policymakers can implement and combine hard and
soft law instruments. Hard law references enforceable action by the
government (e.g., laws and treaties). This is a purposefully deliberative
process that slowly digests the effects of emerging technologies. The
political consensus-making required for this type of action makes it
difficult to create or change a government act once it is approved, and
its effectiveness depends on the credibility and power of the enforcer.
Alternatively, soft law mechanisms “set substantive
expectations that are not directly enforceable by government” (e.g.,
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codes of conduct, industry standards, among others).298 Even though
they are voluntary, their flexibility means that any entity can
experiment with ideas to solve a problem. Soft law may serve as a
bridge solution between no regulation and hard regulation, or used in
conjunction to it. This trait is advantageous considering that emerging
technologies, such as AI, may be in their infancy and neither
policymakers nor consumers truly understand their repercussions,
making any action to control it untimely or premature.299
C. Temporality of Gaps
The analysis of gaps involved determining when AI policy
challenges are encountered. This systematic review found a virtual split
between gaps experienced today or speculated to occur in the future
(see Table 19). An explanation for this finding is that the U.S. is in the
middle of a transition. One where applications and methods of AI are
permeating society and policymakers should expect more regulatory
gaps.
Table 19 – Temporality of Gaps
Temporality
Future
Present

Definition

Distribution in
the systematic
review

The gap is speculated to
24
occur in the future.
The gap is currently
27
experienced.

With existing gaps that were not proactively addressed,
governments are limited to one of two strategies: reactive or limited
action. A reactive strategy is characterized by the presence of a trigger
before a policy decision is made. In many cases, policymakers have no
choice but to react because regulatory mechanisms are unprepared to
proactively identify policy challenges. The element of surprise may
force the government to adjust or create regulation in haste, with
insufficient information, or without having a mastery over the problem
at hand. Limited action is a strategy where the government takes a step
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back and either outsources its regulatory powers to third parties or
waits for a technology to develop before a course of action is taken.
The use of force and privacy literature are particularly affected
by existing gaps. Weapon systems with autonomous features are
arguably already stocked in the inventories of armies throughout the
world. Yet, the parameters for human control, their legal use, and a
consensus definition remain unresolved. In privacy, AI is currently
altering the social norms on the treatment of personal information and
all of the regulatory gaps identified in this section are currently
experienced by consumers.
For regulatory gaps in the future, governments have time to
plan for the implications of AI. Unlike challenges in the present, future
ones can be proactively studied and addressed. An application that
dominates the conversation in this regard is completely AVs. Even
though no vehicle on the road is built with completely autonomous
capabilities, the future impact of this technology is extensively
discussed in the safety and certification and accountability literature.
Overall, no prescription on the timeliness for resolving a
regulatory gap exists. Proactive measures may negatively impact
consumers by limiting their access to technology with significant
benefits. Reactive ones may be implemented after a social rubicon that
makes them unenforceable or obsolete. Alas, a limited or no action
strategy can subject policymakers to the will of non-government actors.
With all strategies, stakeholders face a Collingridge
dilemma.300 On the one hand, they lack information as to the potential
effects of an emerging technology when it is introduced in the market.
Thus, they cannot predict how extensively it will challenge policies and
act on them. On the other, delaying action until more information is
available could risk addressing a regulatory gap until after the
technology diffuses in society. By this point, the power of
policymakers to control its effects could be diminished.
D. Government Level
Federal (70%) and state (60%) authorities garnered the most
attention from scholars (see Table 20). This made the literature on local
government (14%) an uncommon sight in the systematic review. The
data from this article supports the view that gaps generated by AI
appear to fall under jurisdictions with authority over swaths of the
population that are larger than a city or county.
300
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Table 20 - Government Levels of Gaps
Government Level
Distribution in the systematic review
Federal
35
State
30
Local
7
Local policymakers are the first and, in many cases, only
contact with government services for individuals. Despite the dearth of
literature on regulatory gaps under their jurisdiction, there are gaps
caused by AI left unaddressed in this systematic review. Like their
counterparts at the state and federal level, local policymakers are
limited in their ability to address the medium and long-term
implications of emerging technologies by short-term politics and the
immediate needs of denizens in their jurisdiction. As a new generation
of AI applications and methods crystalizes, the potential to learn from
actions taken at different jurisdictions offers a first approach to guide
the policy playbook for local government. Further, to combat the
scarcity of literature on local AI policy challenges, these policymakers
could resort to thematic or national associations that agglomerate their
interests with the purpose of researching, analyzing, and forecasting
how AI shapes regulation.
E. Applications Versus Methods of AI
This article distinguishes between applications and methods of
AI. Methods refer to approaches to accomplish a goal (e.g., neural
networks), while applications are the goal itself (e.g., AVs). The
systematic review found that applications of AI were the dominant
cause of regulatory gaps (see Table 21).
Table 21 – Applications vs. Methods of AI
Use of AI
Distribution in the systematic review
Applications
47
Methods
5
All applications in this article represent narrow or weak forms
of AI, those developed for a specific purpose. Out of these, AVs were
the most referenced. Their role in creating regulatory gaps in
commercial accountability can serve as an analogy for assigning the
pecuniary and non-pecuniary responsibility for applications outside the
transportation sector. This is less so the case of AV mentions in the
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safety section, where their regulatory particularities (i.e. shared
jurisdiction between federal and state government) have limited
relevance to other sectors.
An important number of applications with present and future
social consequences are virtually absent from this systematic review,
such as: autonomous airplanes or facial recognition technology.
Notably, the next step in the evolution of AI, general artificial
intelligence or strong AI, “highly autonomous systems that outperform
humans at most economically valuable work,” does not appear in this
systematic review.301 Explanations for this phenomenon include
sampling issues with the protocol or a lack of incentives in academia
to research the policy implications of applications that are unlikely to
occur in the short or medium term.
Few regulatory gaps in the systematic review were caused by
AI methods. The majority of these were catalyzed by the need for
explainability and transparency in regulatory contexts. AI methods
such as neural networks can produce extremely accurate predictions,
but may do so without justifying the variables or processes that led to
a conclusion. This generates conflict in settings where understanding
the reasoning for an output is crucial (i.e. probable cause and due
process).
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this systematic review was to increase our
understanding of the relationship between AI and public policy. It led
to the development of a protocol that screened 5,240 articles and
uncovered 50 regulatory gaps caused by AI methods or applications in
the U.S. These gaps were characterized in several ways, including two
lenses adapted from the work of Bennett-Moses’s framework and
Calo’s taxonomy.
Overall, this effort revealed that: most gaps can likely be
solved with adjustments to the status quo, the U.S. is in a temporal
transition period with respect to AI-based gaps, the vast majority of
gaps affect federal and state regulations, and AI applications are
recognized more often than methods as the cause of gaps.
It is not speculative to state that AI will continue to push the boundaries
of public policy for the foreseeable future. This work contributes to the
literature by, for the first time, systematically reviewing the corpus of
301
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academic discourse on the subject through lenses that offer
stakeholders (policymakers, the private sector, and non-profits) novel
insights into this technology’s unintended regulatory consequences. It
also opens new lines of research for future scholars wishing to
duplicate this review on geographies outside of the U.S., scrutinize
gaps identified in this document, or employ the labels used for AI on
other technologies.
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APPENDIX 1 – PRISMA CHECKLIST

PRISMA-P (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic review and
Meta-Analysis Protocols) 2015 checklist: recommended items to
address in a systematic review protocol*
Section
and Item Checklist item
Reported
topic
No
on Page
ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION
Title:
1a Identify the report as a protocol of 133
Identification
a systematic review
Update
1b If the protocol is for an update of a previous systematic review,
identify as such
Registration
2
If registered, provide the name of 133
the registry (such as PROSPERO)
and registration number
Authors:
Contact
3a Provide
name,
institutional Title Page
affiliation, e-mail address of all
protocol authors; provide physical
mailing address of corresponding
author
3b Describe contributions of protocol Contributions
authors and identify the guarantor
of the review
Amendments
4
If the protocol represents an amendment of a previously
completed or published protocol,
identify as such and list changes;
otherwise,
state
plan
for
documenting important protocol
amendments
Support:
Sources
5a Indicate sources of financial or Title Page
other support for the review
Sponsor
5b Provide name for the review funder and/or sponsor
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Role
sponsor
funder

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.
of 5c
or

INTRODUCTION
Rationale
6

Objectives

7

METHODS
Eligibility
criteria

8

Information
sources

9

Search strategy 10

[Vol. 38

Describe roles of funder(s), sponsor(s), and/or institution(s), if
any, in developing the protocol
Describe the rationale for the 133
review in the context of what is
already known
Provide an explicit statement of 133
the question(s) the review will
address with reference to
participants,
interventions,
comparators,
and
outcomes
(PICO)
Specify the study characteristics 137
(such as PICO, study design,
setting, time frame) and report
characteristics (such as years
considered, language, publication
status) to be used as criteria for
eligibility for the review
Describe all intended information 134
sources (such as electronic
databases, contact with study
authors, trial registers or other
grey literature sources) with
planned dates of coverage
Present draft of search strategy to 134
be used for at least one electronic
database, including planned
limits, such that it could be
repeated

Study records:
Data
11a Describe the mechanism(s) that management
will be used to manage records
and data throughout the review
Selection 11b State the process that will be used 137
process
for selecting studies (such as two
independent reviewers) through
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Data
collection
process

Data items

11c

12

Outcomes and 13
prioritization

Risk of bias in 14
individual
studies

Data synthesis

15a

15b

15c

each phase of the review (that is,
screening,
eligibility
and
inclusion in meta-analysis)
Describe planned method of 138
extracting data from reports (such
as
piloting
forms,
done
independently, in duplicate), any
processes for obtaining and
confirming
data
from
investigators
List and define all variables for which data will be sought (such as
PICO items, funding sources),
any pre-planned data assumptions
and simplifications
List and define all outcomes for which data will be sought,
including prioritization of main
and additional outcomes, with
rationale
Describe anticipated methods for 140
assessing risk of bias of individual
studies, including whether this
will be done at the outcome or
study level, or both; state how this
information will be used in data
synthesis
Describe criteria under which study data will be quantitatively
synthesized
If data are appropriate for quantitative synthesis, describe
planned summary measures,
methods of handling data and
methods of combining data from
studies, including any planned
exploration of consistency (such
as I2, Kendall’s τ)
Describe any proposed additional analyses (such as sensitivity or
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subgroup
analyses,
metaregression)
15d If quantitative synthesis is not 138
appropriate, describe the type of
summary planned
Meta-bias(es) 16 Specify any planned assessment of meta-bias(es) (such as
publication bias across studies,
selective reporting within studies)
Confidence in 17 Describe how the strength of the cumulative
body of evidence will be assessed
evidence
(such as GRADE)
From: Shamseer L, Moher D, Clarke M, Ghersi D, Liberati A,
Petticrew M, Shekelle P, Stewart L, PRISMA-P Group. Preferred
reporting items for systematic review and meta-analysis protocols
(PRISMA-P) 2015: elaboration and explanation. BMJ. 2015 Jan
2;349(jan02 1):g7647.

